PPP模式下的城市基础设施政府监管机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-13 02:07

本文关键词： 政府监管基础设施 ppp 博弈论　出处：《山东建筑大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：ppp模式下私人企业和政府合作共同建设基础设施,使市场实现了公平竞争,改变了政府垄断基础设施的局面。但是单靠市场机制不能使资源得到最优配置,不能满足社会公众的需要,甚至引起市场失灵,所以政府的监管十分有必要的。加之基础设施项目工程巨大,工艺也非常复杂,很容易在建设期和项目运营期出现问题。私人企业追求自身利益的最大化,与基础设施服务公众的目的有些冲突,所以政府有必要进行监管,有必要建立一套综合性的监管体系。本文先论述了研究的背景,研究意义和国内外的发展现状,通过技术路线的形式为全文梳理了框架结构。对城市基础设施的概念,项目区分理论,政府监管的相关理论进行了论述,为后面论文的展开做好理论基础的铺垫。然后对我国现阶段政府监管现状进行了说明,指出了我国政府监管还存有的缺陷和问题:缺乏针对性的法律依据,监管机构的权责不够集中,容易出现监管漏洞和相互推诿的现象,监管机构的专业性和独立性不够,没有一个完善的定价机制。同时对比国外发达国家美国,英国,新加坡的监管方式,从而借鉴他们的经验。在委托代理理论和博弈论理论的共同运用下,建立ppp模式相关的道德风险模型,对模型进行演绎,定量分析如何运用激励约束机制使政府的利益最大化,减少因为私人企业的道德风险造成的危害。得出的结论是,因为项目风险巨大和工艺复杂,要提高进入基础设施市场的门槛,由于信息的不对称性还要增加一些激励和约束机制。根据以上的分析,梳理了ppp模式下基础设施政府监管的整体设计思路,从而得出了建立综合性独立的监管机构的结论。最后建立了矩阵式的综合性独立的监管机制,矩阵式的监管机构可以有效防止权利滥用及腐败问题的发生,而且可以增加部门之间的交流,提高资源的利用率。同时对公众参与监督的途径进行了说明,指出公众监管处于劣势地位,而且公众监管的积极性不高,需要政府进一步引导。ppp模式下的政府监管后评估指出运用PDCA(计划,执行,检查,纠偏)的方法,对监管的效果,经济效益,社会效益进行评估,从而发现问题所在,为以后更好的监管提供有利的意见和建议。
[Abstract]:Under the ppp model, private enterprises and governments cooperate to build infrastructure, which makes the market achieve fair competition and changes the situation of government monopoly infrastructure, but market mechanism alone can not make the optimal allocation of resources. Unable to meet the needs of the public and even causing market failure, so the government's supervision is very necessary. In addition, the infrastructure projects are huge, and the process is very complicated. It's easy to have problems during the construction and project operations. The private sector's pursuit of maximum self-interest is somewhat at odds with the purpose of infrastructure services to the public, so the government needs to regulate it. It is necessary to establish a comprehensive regulatory system. This paper first discusses the background of the research, the significance of the research and the development of the current situation at home and abroad, combing the framework structure for the full text through the form of technical route. The theory of project differentiation and the related theories of government supervision are discussed, which lays the foundation for the following papers. Then, it explains the present situation of government supervision in our country. The defects and problems of government supervision in China are pointed out, such as lack of specific legal basis, insufficient concentration of authority and responsibility, easy to appear the phenomenon of supervision loophole and mutual prevarication, insufficient specialization and independence of supervision organization. There is no perfect pricing mechanism. At the same time, the regulatory methods of the United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore, which are more developed than foreign countries, can be used for reference. Under the joint application of the principal-agent theory and the game theory, Establish the moral hazard model related to ppp model, deduce the model, quantitatively analyze how to use incentive and restraint mechanism to maximize the benefits of government and reduce the harm caused by the moral hazard of private enterprise. In order to raise the threshold for entry into the infrastructure market, because of the huge risks and complex workmanship of the project, some incentive and constraint mechanisms have to be added because of the asymmetry of information. Combing the overall design ideas of infrastructure government supervision under the ppp mode, the conclusion of establishing comprehensive and independent regulatory agencies is obtained. Finally, a comprehensive and independent regulatory mechanism is established. Matrix regulators can effectively prevent abuse of power and corruption, increase communication between departments and increase the utilization of resources. It also illustrates the ways in which the public can participate in supervision. It points out that the public supervision is in the inferior position, and the enthusiasm of the public supervision is not high, so it needs the government to further guide the post-supervision evaluation of the government under the model of .ppp and points out the effect of using the method of PDCA (plan, execution, inspection, correction) to the supervision. The economic and social benefits are evaluated to find out the problems, and to provide favorable advice and suggestions for better supervision in the future.
【学位授予单位】：山东建筑大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F299.24;F283

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