网络价格欺诈现象的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-25 20:35

本文选题：网络价格欺诈行为　切入点：信息不对称　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文首先整理和总结了价格欺诈行为经济学分析的相关文献综述,随后列出价格欺诈的内涵成因、表现形式、常见的案例,继而介绍了博弈论的发展、博弈论的相关元素、常见网络价格欺诈行为现象,为分析网络价格欺诈现象作出铺垫。在此基础上,本文构建了网络价格欺诈行为中的各个参与方——网络经营者、网络销售平台、政府价格监管部门以及消费者之间的博弈模型,并得出相应支付矩阵。在对网络经营者之间的相关博弈中,得出结果是理论上双方会进行价格欺诈。在实证中,常有网络经营者利用虚假原价与标价无从依据手段来进行价格欺诈。在网络销售平台经营者和政府之间的博弈中,得出的结果是网络经营者是否选择价格欺诈行为与进行价格欺诈的多余收益大小以及价格监管部门的的处罚力度有关。在实证中,由于政府处罚力度较小,他们之间的单次博弈中,网络经营者收益较大,从而网络经营者会选择价格欺诈。在消费者与网络经营者的相关博弈中,分两种情况讨论。第一种情况是消费者在网络交易前与网络网络经营者的博弈,消者者会因为网络经营者投入的欺诈成本的多少而受骗,“自愿地”跳入网络经营者的价格陷阱,网络经营者又会因为面临可能被处罚的成本高低而选择价格欺诈行为的发生率;第二种情况是当消费者受到价格欺诈后,消费者的行为受到鉴定成本、交涉成本、赔偿的多少等因素影响,网络经营者的行为则受到网络销售平台的处罚力度、价格监管部门的处罚力度等因素影响。在实证中,消费者因为目前维权成本太高,赔偿的又不多,缺乏价格欺诈行为的法律法规知识,投诉渠道少、投诉程序繁琐等因素选择放弃投诉和举报的权利,而网络经营者则因为网络销售平台的隐性包庇和价格监管部门的软弱无力的执法力度而继续采取价格欺诈行为作为最优策略。在网络销售平台与政府的博弈中,影响网络销售平台改革与否主要来源是国家的减税免税、处罚力度与改革后收益。实证中,国家没有较大的税收政策支持改革,则网络消费平台改革后收益不确定;如果没有强而有力的处罚力度,也很难使网络销售平台迈出改革的第一步。实证中,网络销售平台既想改革价格标价机制,营造诚信守信的经营环境,又想不赶走网络经营者和减少网络消费总成交量,网络销售平台处于两难境地。最后,结合上述模型结论,本文认为:政府应加快成立社会诚信体系建设,宽严相济、完善和重新界定处罚标准;短期内加大对价格监管的行政资源投入,长期内保持常态化的监管成本并借助新技术减少监管成本;制定为网络销售平台的守法激励机制,通过减税免税的政策鼓励网络消费平台作出改革,加大对受价格欺诈后对消费者的赔偿金额,整顿平台内的价格欺诈行为;规范政府监管者行为,加快法制建设,保障良好的法律环境;建议网络消费者加强防范价格欺诈意识,正确引导职业举报人。
[Abstract]:This paper firstly summarizes the related literature summary analysis of price fraud behavior economics, then lists the connotation of origin, price fraud forms, common case, then introduces the development of game theory, the related elements of the game theory, the price of common network fraud phenomenon, to pave the way for the analysis of network on the basis of price fraud phenomenon. In this paper, the price of fraud network participants -- network operators, network sales platform, the game model between the government and the consumer price supervision department, and obtained the corresponding payoff matrix. In the game between the network operators, the result is the theory on both sides will be price fraud. In empirical research. There is often no basis to network operators to use means of price fraud and false original price. Between the sales network platform operators and government In the game, the result is the network operator whether the choice of price fraud related to excess returns the size of the price fraud and price supervision department punishment. In the empirical research, because the government penalties small, single game between them, network operators greater income, so the network operators will choose the price in fraud. The related network game between consumers and operators, are divided into two kinds. The first is to discuss the consumer in game network transactions before and network operators, consumers will because the number of network operators into the cost of fraud and deception, "voluntarily" into the price trap network operators, network operators will be because of facing may be the punishment cost level and the choice of the incidence of price fraud; the second is when consumers are price fraud, consumers The conduct of identification cost, negotiation cost, influence factors of compensation and the number of network operators, the behavior of punishment by network marketing platform, the influencing factors of price regulatory penalties and so on. In the empirical research, the consumer because of the high cost of rights, compensation not much, lack of price fraud laws and regulations knowledge of the complaint channel less complaints and reports, give up the right to choose the complaint cumbersome procedures and other factors, the network operators because sales network platform of tacit shielding and the price supervision department the weak and feeble and continue to take hold of the power price fraud is the optimal strategy. In game sales network platform with the government, the reform of network sales whether the platform is the main source of national tax exemption, punishment and reform of income. The empirical, countries do not have larger tax policy support change Leather, the network consumption platform after the reform of revenue uncertainty; penalties if no strong, it is very difficult to make the first step towards reform. The network marketing platform demonstration, sales network platform is to reform the price the price mechanism, build the integrity and trustworthiness of the operating environment, and do not want to get rid of network operators and reduce the network consumption the total turnover, sales network platform is in a dilemma. Finally, combined with the model conclusions, this paper argues that: the government should speed up the establishment of social credit system construction, leniency, perfection and redefining the standard of punishment; the short term increase on the price regulation of administrative resources investment, be long-term normalization of supervision cost and with the new technology to reduce regulatory costs; for the network marketing platform to abide by the incentive mechanism, through the tax exemption policy to encourage consumption of network platform to reform, increase the price of fraud The amount of compensation for consumers is to rectify the price fraud in the platform, regulate the behavior of government regulators, speed up the construction of legal system, and guarantee a good legal environment. It is suggested that Internet consumers should strengthen awareness of price fraud and guide career whistleblowers correctly.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F274;F224.32

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