基于微分博弈的军民融合协同创新体系技术共享行为研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 17:19

本文选题：微分博弈 + 军民融合　；参考：《管理工程学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：针对军民融合协同创新体系中军工企业和民用企业的技术共享问题,构建微分博弈模型,分别考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈三种情形下双方的最优策略、最优收益及体系整体收益情况。通过均衡结果的比较分析发现:(1)双方的技术共享努力程度随着技术共享成本系数、技术衰减系数的增大而降低,随着技术创新能力系数、边际收益系数、技术创新影响系数的增加而升高;(2)"补贴因子"作为一种激励机制,可提高民用企业最优技术共享努力水平、双方最优收益及体系整体收益,而军工企业的技术共享行为保持不变;(3)在协同合作博弈情形下,双方最优策略及体系最优收益均严格优于非合作情形。为进一步协调双方技术共享行为,求得了能够使军工企业和民用企业的个体收益达到Pareto最优的体系整体收益分配系数的取值范围。最后利用算例分析验证了理论推导的结论。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of technology sharing between military enterprises and civil enterprises in the system of military and civilian cooperation innovation, the differential game model is constructed, and the optimal strategies of Nash non-cooperative game, principal and subordinate game and cooperative game, are investigated respectively. The optimal return and the overall income of the system. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the effort degree of technological sharing between the two sides decreases with the increase of cost coefficient and attenuation coefficient of technology sharing, and decreases with the coefficient of technological innovation ability and marginal income coefficient. As an incentive mechanism, the "subsidy factor" can improve the level of the optimal technology sharing efforts, the optimal income of both sides and the overall income of the system, as a kind of incentive mechanism, the increase of the influence coefficient of technological innovation, and the increase of the "subsidy factor" as an incentive mechanism. However, the technology sharing behavior of military enterprises remains the same.) in the case of cooperative game, the optimal policy and system optimal income of both parties are strictly superior to those of non-cooperation. In order to further coordinate the behavior of technology sharing between the two sides, the range of the overall income distribution coefficient of the system which can make the individual income of the military and civilian enterprises reach the Pareto optimal value is obtained. Finally, the conclusion of theoretical derivation is verified by example analysis.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972117) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20100032110037) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630286)
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.48

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