参与方情绪对土地征收补偿策略的影响研究——基于RDEU演化博弈视角

发布时间：2018-05-10 05:42

本文选题：土地征收补偿 + 演化博弈　；参考：《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》2017年09期

【摘要】：将等级依赖期望效用理论与演化博弈理论相结合,构建土地征收补偿的RDEU演化博弈模型,探讨土地征收补偿中主要参与方农民和地方政府的情绪对博弈策略的影响状况。稳定性分析显示与以往结论不同的是,"乐观情绪会带来好的结果,悲观情绪会带来差的结果"仅仅在一方理性一方有情绪的组合状态下才符合。当参与方都具有悲观或乐观情绪时,双方的异质性信念互动反而使征地博弈没有演化稳定均衡。MATLAB仿真结果表明,具有情绪的一方悲观或乐观情绪程度的改变将会影响博弈均衡状态,且地方政府的情绪状态更易影响均衡结果。最后,针对征地矛盾的治理问题,提出建立情绪监督与疏导机制等建议。
[Abstract]:Combining the expected utility theory of rank dependence with the evolutionary game theory, the RDEU evolutionary game model of land expropriation compensation is constructed, and the influence of the emotion of farmers and local governments on the game strategy in land expropriation compensation is discussed. Stability analysis shows that, unlike previous conclusions, "optimism will bring good results, pessimism will bring bad results" only when one of the rational side has a combination of emotions. When the participants are pessimistic or optimistic, the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs between the two sides makes the land expropriation game have no evolutionary stability equilibrium. MATLAB simulation results show that, The change of the degree of pessimism or optimism of the emotional side will affect the game equilibrium, and the emotional state of the local government is more likely to affect the equilibrium results. Finally, in view of the land requisition contradiction management question, proposed establishes the emotion supervision and the dredging mechanism and so on.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71671187)
【分类号】：F224.32;F301.2

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