食品安全诚信监管博弈研究

发布时间：2018-06-02 02:40

本文选题：食品安全 + 诚信监管　；参考：《山东师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：食品安全关乎居民身体健康,近年来频频曝出的食品安全事件引发了社会各界对食品安全的高度重视。食品安全由于其信任品属性使得食品安全信息在政府监管部门与食品企业之间、食品企业与消费者之间严重不对称,食品企业在利益驱使下选择失信经营生产不合格食品的概率很大,因此需要对食品企业进行诚信监管。食品安全由于其公共产品、外部性等属性使得食品安全诚信监管需要政府主导进行。在梳理我国政府部门在食品安全诚信监管方面的监管职责分工的基础上,运用博弈论的方法先后构建了食品企业与消费者间食品安全诚信监管博弈模型,基于食品企业规模分别构建了小规模食品企业与地方监管部门、大规模食品企业与地方监管部门间食品安全诚信监管博弈模型,在构建两方博弈基础上又构建了政府监管部门、食品企业与消费者三方间食品安全诚信监管动态博弈模型。针对影响机理较为复杂的影响因素进行了算例分析,以直观得出其对各博弈主体均衡策略选择的影响机理。结合博弈分析以及算例分析的结果可以得出在食品安全诚信监管问题上政府监管部门、食品企业与消费者之间是激励不相容的,即有些政府监管部门不积极进行监管,监管过程中存在滥用职权的情况,食品企业在经济利益驱使下选择失信经营生产不合格食品危害消费者健康,消费者维权意识低,不积极对食品安全采取投诉等间接监管行动。结合各方的博弈机理,提出了实现各博弈方激励相容的对策措施:政府监管部门通过改变地方政府利益格局、事后追责与事前激励相结合、政务公开制度等措施促使其自觉主动地进行食品安全诚信监管;食品企业通过完善信息沟通机制以扩大声誉效益,利用社会监管力量,增强对其的处罚力度等使其自觉主动地采取诚信经营策略;消费者通过增强对其维权的宣传教育、降低维权成本等措施促使其自觉参与到食品安全诚信监管行列中。
[Abstract]:Food safety is related to the health of residents. In recent years, the frequent exposure of food safety incidents has caused the community to attach great importance to food safety. Because of its trust property, food safety information is asymmetrical between the government supervision department and the food enterprise, and between the food enterprise and the consumer. The probability of food enterprises choosing to run and produce unqualified food under the driving of profit is very large, so it is necessary to supervise food enterprises in good faith. Due to its public products and externalities, food safety needs government-led supervision. On the basis of combing the division of responsibilities of government departments in the supervision of food safety integrity, the game model of food safety integrity supervision between food enterprises and consumers has been constructed by using the method of game theory. Based on the scale of food enterprises, the game model between small-scale food enterprises and local regulatory authorities, large-scale food enterprises and local regulatory authorities on food safety integrity supervision is constructed, and then the government supervision department is constructed on the basis of two-party game. The dynamic game model of food safety and good faith supervision between food enterprises and consumers. In order to find out the influence mechanism of the game players' equilibrium strategy selection, a numerical example is given to analyze the factors which influence the mechanism of the game. Combined with the result of game analysis and example analysis, it can be concluded that the government supervision department, food enterprise and consumer are incentive incompatible on the issue of food safety integrity supervision, that is, some government regulators do not actively carry out supervision. There is abuse of power in the process of supervision and control. Food enterprises choose to discredit and produce unqualified food under the economic interests and harm consumers' health. Consumers have low awareness of protecting their rights and do not actively take indirect regulatory actions such as complaints against food safety. Combined with the game mechanism of all parties, the paper puts forward the countermeasures to realize the incentive compatibility of the game parties: the government supervision department combines the responsibility after the event with the prior incentive by changing the interest pattern of the local government. Measures such as the system of open government affairs and other measures have encouraged them to take the initiative to supervise and supervise food safety, and food enterprises have made use of the power of social supervision to expand their reputation and benefit by improving the information communication mechanism. Strengthen its punishment and other measures to consciously take the initiative to take good faith management strategy; consumers through strengthening their rights of publicity and education to reduce the cost of safeguarding their rights and other measures to promote their conscious participation in food safety integrity supervision ranks.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F203;F224.32

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