责任保险的社会管理功能研究

发布时间：2018-05-06 14:20

本文选题：责任保险 + 社会管理　；参考：《金融与经济》2015年11期

【摘要】：本文研究责任保险存在的合理性及其所拥有的社会管理功能,在第二部分,本文揭示了最优责任保险的存在性。指出在完美的信息条件下,严格责任制度下责任保险的存在符合社会最优,疏忽责任制下则不会产生责任保险的需求。在第三部分,作者指出法律系统的不确定性是导致疏忽责任制度下责任保险需求的来源,同时文章还分析了判决证明问题对责任保险的影响。在第四部分,本文分析了对责任保险禁止和强制的作用,指出禁止责任保险的购买不符合责任保险发展潮流,而责任保险的强制购买在一些特殊领域如存在判决证明问题的情况是有其合理性的。最后本文进行了总结并提出了建议。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the rationality of the existence of liability insurance and its social management functions. In the second part, this paper reveals the existence of optimal liability insurance. It is pointed out that under the perfect information condition, the existence of liability insurance under strict liability system accords with the social optimum, while the requirement of liability insurance does not arise under negligence responsibility system. In the third part, the author points out that the uncertainty of the legal system is the source of the demand for liability insurance under the negligence liability system. At the same time, the author analyzes the influence of the judgment proof problem on the liability insurance. In the fourth part, this paper analyzes the role of prohibition and compulsion of liability insurance, and points out that the purchase of prohibited liability insurance does not conform to the development trend of liability insurance. The compulsory purchase of liability insurance in some special areas such as the existence of the problem of proof of judgment is reasonable. Finally, this paper summarizes and puts forward some suggestions.
【作者单位】：广西大学商学院;
【基金】：作者所主持的2014年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目成果,项目名称《基于行为实验的责任保险主体合作行为研究》,项目批准号14YJC790170
【分类号】：F842.69

【参考文献】