机动车保险欺诈的管理研究

发布时间：2018-09-14 14:25

【摘要】：随着经济和社会的持续发展,中国汽车市场的发展非常迅速,每年新增人均汽车保有量以及汽车生产数量都在稳步上升,这些现象表明了之前中国改革发展的丰硕果实,同时也验证了我国人民的生活水平达到了一个新的高度。但是,随着机动车数量的不断提高,交通事故造成的损失占意外伤害的损失比例一直居高不下,这样的现象表明,机动车的使用在给予我们生活方便的同时,也为人们带来了一些负面影响。交通事故赔偿问题已经逐步成为一个突出的社会问题,并由此使机动车辆保险得到了快速发展,并一跃成为了财产保险中的第一大险种。2014上半年,机动车辆保费收入已经占到财产保险公司总保费收入的70%以上,机动车辆保险的经营状况好坏直接影响到财产保险公司生死存亡,但与之并存的车险欺诈问题已成为车险发展的瓶颈。保险欺诈的存在导致了汽车保险市场目前畸形的经营状况,必将导致汽车保险业务的发展发生巨大波动。信息不对称致使保险欺诈成为了世界性的难题,这一难题已经严重制约了保险公司的发展,而保险公司为了发展将这一风险分散给了诚实的投保人,为此,诚实的投保人必须支付额外的费用,来为保险欺诈“买单”。据统计,因保险欺诈而额外支付的费用在不断增加。据有关报道,国际保险业的欺诈平均损失大约在10%-30%；我国保险欺诈活动也大量增加,诈骗犯罪中保险欺诈大约占到20%。所以目前车险行业面临的一个重大战略课题就是：如何更加有效地防范汽车保险诈骗,以获得行业的健康持续发展和更多的竞争优势。本文以信息不对称理论为主要的论证思想,通过对汽车保险的成因、表现形式及危害进行分析,研究了车险诈骗的内在逻辑,形成本文研究的逻辑起点。然后,通过介绍了相关规定和司法解释,结合案例进而对我国机动车辆保险诈骗管理的现状和存在的问题进行实证研究。同时,运用不完全信息动态博弈理论对保险公司与投保人之间的博弈关系进行研究。通过构建不完全信息动态博弈模型,研究分析保险公司和投保人相互之间的博弈过程、最优策略和重复博弈,并通过研究博弈均衡结果努力寻找机动车辆保险诈骗的解决途径。最后,结合实证研究和模型分析的结果,并且借鉴发达国家在机动车辆保险诈骗防范方面的成功经验,对我国机动车辆保险诈骗管理体系进行优化并提出改进建议。
[Abstract]:With the sustained development of economy and society, the auto market in China is developing very rapidly. Every year, the number of new cars per capita and the number of automobile production are rising steadily. These phenomena indicate the fruitful fruits of China's previous reform and development. At the same time, it also verifies that the living standard of our people has reached a new height. However, with the continuous increase of the number of motor vehicles, the loss caused by traffic accidents has been high in proportion to the loss of accidental injuries. This phenomenon shows that the use of motor vehicles gives us convenience in life at the same time. It also brings some negative effects to people. The problem of compensation for traffic accidents has gradually become a prominent social problem, and as a result, the motor vehicle insurance has developed rapidly, and has become the largest type of insurance in property insurance in the first half of 2014. The insurance premium income of motor vehicles has accounted for more than 70% of the total premium income of property insurance companies. The operating condition of motor vehicle insurance has a direct impact on the life and death of property insurance companies. However, the problem of vehicle insurance fraud has become the bottleneck of the development of auto insurance. The existence of insurance fraud has led to the malformation of the auto insurance market at present and will inevitably lead to huge fluctuations in the development of auto insurance business. Information asymmetry causes insurance fraud to become a worldwide problem, which has seriously restricted the development of insurance companies. In order to develop, insurance companies spread this risk to honest policyholders. An honest policyholder must pay an extra fee to pay for insurance fraud. According to statistics, the extra payment due to insurance fraud is increasing. According to relevant reports, the average loss of fraud in the international insurance industry is about 10 to 30 percent, and the number of insurance fraud activities in China has also increased substantially, accounting for about 20 percent of the fraud crimes. So at present an important strategic problem facing the auto insurance industry is how to prevent auto insurance fraud more effectively in order to obtain the healthy and sustainable development of the industry and more competitive advantages. This paper takes the information asymmetry theory as the main argumentation thought, through the analysis of the cause, the manifestation and the harm of the automobile insurance, studies the inherent logic of the automobile insurance fraud, and forms the logical starting point of this paper. Then, through the introduction of relevant regulations and judicial interpretation, combined with a case study of the motor vehicle insurance fraud management status and existing problems are empirically studied. At the same time, the dynamic game theory of incomplete information is used to study the game relationship between insurance company and policy holder. By constructing a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper studies and analyzes the game process, optimal strategy and repeated game between insurance company and policy holder, and tries to find a solution to the fraud of motor vehicle insurance by studying the equilibrium result of game. Finally, combining the results of empirical research and model analysis, and drawing on the successful experiences of developed countries in the prevention of motor vehicle insurance fraud, the paper optimizes the management system of motor vehicle insurance fraud in China and puts forward some suggestions for improvement.
【学位授予单位】：云南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.63

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