P公司基于信息不对称的制造外包风险研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 05:19

本文选题：制造外包 + 信息不对称　；参考：《华中科技大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济全球化时代的到来，不同国家和地域之间的分工合作也不断的发展和深入。国际分工给传统大而全，小而全的管理模式带来冲击的同时也给企业带来了机遇。放弃纵向一体化战略，转向横向一体化进程能使企业专注于与核心竞争力相关的业务，并将不擅长的业务外包出去从而实现资源的最优配置。然而，在外包过程中，尤其在信息不对称条件下，必然会产生外包所带来的逆向选择和道德风险。如何采取措施规避此类风险成为管理制造外包的问题。本文以制造外包以及其必要性为出发点，分析了在发包商与承包商信息不对称条件下可能引发的风险和诱因。之后利用信息经济学中委托代理理论结合P公司在制造外包中出现的实际问题进行了阐述，并在文中提出了解决问题的方法和防范风险的对策。首先是针对信息不对称下发包商有限理性做出的逆向选择的决策风险。可以通过增加信息搜索成本、建立供应商信息库、以及提高承包商的违约成本来改变信息劣势的地位。目的是促使承包商共享私有信息，达到信息的对称化。其次是通过加强对供应链上游企业以及承包商的监督和控制，，以及从契约的再设计上去约束和激励承包商，去解决因为目标不一致所引发的机会主义行为和道德风险。最后对成效和不足进行了预测。本文力图找到有效的措施，使P公司达到制造外包的初衷，避免在外包中出现损害P公司利益的行为,最终做到供应链上各企业间的信息透明，利益共享和风险共担。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of the era of economic globalization, the division of labor and cooperation between different countries and regions has been developing and deepening. The international division of labor brings impact to the traditional large and complete, small and complete management mode, but also brings opportunities to enterprises. Giving up the vertical integration strategy and turning to the horizontal integration process can enable the enterprise to focus on the business related to the core competitiveness and outsource the business that is not good at it so as to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. However, in the process of outsourcing, especially under the condition of asymmetric information, the adverse selection and moral hazard will inevitably occur. How to take measures to avoid such risks has become a problem of management manufacturing outsourcing. Based on manufacturing outsourcing and its necessity, this paper analyzes the risks and inducements caused by the asymmetric information between the contractor and the contractor. Then, by using the principal-agent theory in information economics and the practical problems in manufacturing outsourcing of P Company, the paper puts forward the methods to solve the problems and the countermeasures to prevent the risks. The first is the decision risk of adverse selection based on the limited rationality of information asymmetry. The position of information disadvantage can be changed by increasing the cost of information searching, establishing the supplier information database, and raising the contractor's default cost. The purpose is to encourage contractors to share private information and achieve information symmetry. Secondly, by strengthening the supervision and control of the upstream enterprises and contractors in the supply chain, as well as restraining and encouraging the contractors from the contract re-design, the opportunistic behavior and moral hazard caused by inconsistent objectives can be solved. Finally, the results and shortcomings are predicted. This paper tries to find effective measures to make P Company achieve the original intention of manufacturing outsourcing, avoid the behavior of harming the interests of P Company in outsourcing, and finally achieve the information transparency, benefit sharing and risk sharing among the enterprises in the supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272;F719

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