基于努力水平契约不完全性的呼叫服务外包合同设计研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 11:43

本文选题：外包 + 合同设计　；参考：《浙江大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：服务外包作为一种新兴的产业组织方式业已成为第二次经济全球化的主要推动力。服务外包以其在强化核心竞争力、节约成本、获取业务成长、提高创新能力、提高顾客满意度和增强快速响应能力等方面具有的强大优势成为企业的一个重要战略选择,它赋予了组织应对快速变化的环境所必需的灵活性,同时它也使组织在竞争激烈的市场环境中能将精力集中于组织的核心竞争力上从而获得更大的竞争优势。在服务外包中,发包商和接包商通过签订合同对两者的合作关系和利益分配进行明确。但服务外包合同存在契约不完全性,如何对缔约双方进行有效激励约束进而提高整体服务系统的绩效成为研究的重点。本文基于努力水平契约不完全性,选取呼叫服务外包为研究对象,研究服务外包合同的设计与协调。本文提出了收益共享合同和组合式合同两种协调机制。运用博弈论研究这两种协调合同在同时博弈和序贯博弈两种情形中的最优决策,探究合同参数对模型均衡值的影响,对比两种合同协调方案的有效性。在给出理论求解的基础上,本文给出了算例计算,验证结论的有效性。
[Abstract]:As a new way of industrial organization, service outsourcing has become the main driving force of the second economic globalization. Service outsourcing has become an important strategic choice for enterprises because of its strong advantages in strengthening core competitiveness, saving costs, obtaining business growth, improving innovation ability, improving customer satisfaction and enhancing rapid response ability. It endows the organization with the necessary flexibility to cope with the rapidly changing environment. At the same time, it also enables the organization to concentrate on the core competence of the organization in a competitive market environment and gain a greater competitive advantage. In service outsourcing, the contractor and the contractor make clear the relationship of cooperation and the distribution of benefits between them by signing a contract. However, there is incomplete contract in the service outsourcing contract, so how to effectively motivate and restrain the contracting parties to improve the performance of the whole service system has become the focus of the research. Based on the incompleteness of effort level contract, this paper chooses call service outsourcing as the research object, and studies the design and coordination of service outsourcing contract. This paper proposes two kinds of coordination mechanisms: revenue sharing contract and combined contract. Using game theory to study the optimal decision of the two kinds of coordination contracts in the case of simultaneous game and sequential game, to explore the influence of contract parameters on the equilibrium value of the model, and to compare the effectiveness of the two contract coordination schemes. On the basis of theoretical solution, an example is given to verify the validity of the conclusion.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F719;F224.32

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