考虑承接商隐性收益的外包主体收益博弈

发布时间：2018-05-27 14:36

本文选题：隐性收益 + 博弈　；参考：《财经科学》2013年03期

【摘要】：在对外包过程中的主体收益分配研究中,现有研究模型主要针对外包主体的显性收益,很少把隐性收益作为考虑因素。本文构建一个不对称信息的外包商和承接商收益博弈模型,研究外包商在同等激励条件下,承接商考虑隐性收益和不考虑隐性收益时,外包主体付出努力程度及收益分配的变化。研究发现:(1)隐性收益对承接商付出的努力是有影响的。随着承接商的成长,承接商更多考虑显性收益。(2)无论承接商是否考虑隐性收益,发包商都会对外包过程进行监管,其努力水平不变。(3)考虑隐性收益后承接商的总收益增加,随着承接商的发展,隐性收益对总收益产生的增量减少。
[Abstract]:In the research of the main body income distribution in the outsourcing process, the existing research models mainly focus on the explicit income of the outsourcing agent, and seldom take the implicit income as the consideration factor. In this paper, we construct a game model of asymmetric information between the outsourcer and the receiver, and study that when the outsourcer considers the implicit income and does not consider the implicit income under the same incentive condition. The degree of effort and the change of income distribution. The study found that the implicit income has an impact on the effort of the undertaking. With the growth of the contractor, the contractor considers the explicit income more. 2) whether the contractor considers the implicit income or not, the contractor will supervise the outsourcing process, and its level of effort will not change, and the total income of the contractor will increase after considering the implicit income. With the development of the contractor, the increment of the hidden income to the total income is reduced.
【作者单位】：重庆交通大学;重庆交通大学财经学院国际经济与贸易系;重庆交通大学财经学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目“西部农村物流外包发展动力模型及路径研究”(12XJC630003) 国家社会科学基金教育学青年课题“产学研联盟知识转移促进西部地区自主创新研究”(CIA100154)
【分类号】：F719;F224.32

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