考虑风险偏好的外包质量风险控制与激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-08-03 14:16

【摘要】：本文研究了具有不同风险偏好的原始设备制造商(OEM)与合同制造商(CM)构成的委托代理关系,其中承包方CM的质量水平影响产品市场需求,也同时影响双方的各自收益。由于承包方为提高产品质量水平需要付出成本代价,但这种努力通常是难以观测的,从而造成了承包方努力代价成为私有信息,因此在这种委托代理关系中可能存在逆向选择和道德风险问题。发包方OEM设计了菜单式契约机制去激励承包方,在这种契约机制下,承包方自愿揭示自己的努力成本信息,且同时最大化双方的利润。本文建立了OEM主导的Stackerlberg博弈模型,通过求解模型给出了契约的参数,分析了激励契约的性质,并与信息对称情境下的契约对比。研究结果表明:考虑风险偏好的机制不同于风险中性下的契约机制。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the principal-agent relationship between the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the contract manufacturer (CM) which has different risk preference. The quality level of contractor CM affects the market demand of the product as well as the respective income of both parties. Since the contractor pays a cost to improve the quality of the product, such efforts are often difficult to observe, resulting in the contractor's effort being made private, Therefore, there may be adverse selection and moral hazard in this principal-agent relationship. OEM designs a menu contract mechanism to motivate the contractor. Under the contract mechanism, the contractor voluntarily reveals his effort cost information and maximizes the profit of both parties. In this paper, the Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM is established, the parameters of the contract are given by solving the model, the nature of the incentive contract is analyzed, and the contract is compared with the contract in the context of information symmetry. The results show that the mechanism of considering risk preference is different from the contract mechanism under risk neutrality.
【作者单位】：南京理工大大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472087;71172105;71102073) 江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目
【分类号】：F224;F719

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