中国互联网信息服务业管制策略研究

发布时间：2018-11-21 08:08

【摘要】：互联网信息服务业具有明显的网络外部性,但由于互联共享机制的缺失,导致互联网信息服务企业不正当竞争行为频发,阻碍了市场健康发展.研究互联网信息服务业管制中政府管制部门与企业间的委托代理关系,通过在Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中引入代表互联网信息服务企业实施互联共享率的参数,在非对称信息条件下,分析具有不同互联共享效率企业确定性等价收入和总代理成本的变化,在此基础上运用Matlab对模型进行模拟分析.结果表明:在非对称信息条件下,企业互联共享的努力水平越高,确定性等价收入越少;面临相同风险的情况下,实施互联共享效率越高的企业所支付的总代理成本越高.基于以上结论分析,给出相关的政策性建议.
[Abstract]:Internet information service industry has obvious network externality, but because of the lack of interconnection and sharing mechanism, it leads to the frequent unfair competition behavior of Internet information service enterprises, which hinders the healthy development of the market. This paper studies the principal-agent relationship between government regulatory departments and enterprises in the regulation of Internet information service industry. By introducing parameters representing Internet information service enterprises to implement interconnection and sharing rate in Holmstrom-Milgrom model, under the condition of asymmetric information, this paper studies the principal-agent relationship between government regulatory departments and enterprises in the regulation of Internet information services. This paper analyzes the changes of deterministic equivalent income and total agency cost of enterprises with different efficiency of interconnection and sharing, and then uses Matlab to simulate the model. The results show that under the condition of asymmetric information, the higher the level of enterprise sharing is, the less deterministic equivalent income is, and the higher the efficiency of implementing interconnection sharing is, the higher the total agency cost is. Based on the analysis of the above conclusions, the relevant policy recommendations are given.
【作者单位】：重庆邮电大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630071) 重庆市科委软科学项目(cstc2011cx-rkxA00019) 重庆邮电大学博士基金项目(k2011-17)
【分类号】：F49;F719

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