基于互动公平的房地产征收补偿契约均衡评价

发布时间：2018-01-23 05:07

本文关键词： 互动公平房地产征收补偿契约均衡评价最后通牒博弈模型　出处：《山东社会科学》2016年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：房地产征收补偿矛盾是影响我国城镇化发展的突出问题之一,坚持公平公正原则有助于化解房地产征收补偿过程中的各类矛盾。基于互动公平理论,对房地产征收补偿契约均衡进行评价研究。结果表明,互动公平博弈的均衡公平感知参数唯一决定,当公平感知参数较大(大于1/2)时,能够实现较为合理的征收补偿价格;当公平感知参数较小(小于1/2)时,均衡为(低价,接受)。尽管征收人完全可能存在公平心理,但也无法扭转被征收人面临以低价接受的房地产征收局面。因此,只有在公平感知参数较大,即征收人具有较高的公平特征时,才能保证被征收人得到一个较为合理的征收补偿。不过,在低价征收时,因为出于公平性的考虑,被征收者会获得比传统博弈下更高的效用与收益。
[Abstract]:The contradiction of real estate expropriation and compensation is one of the outstanding problems affecting the development of urbanization in China. Adhering to the principle of fairness and justice helps to resolve all kinds of contradictions in the process of real estate expropriation and compensation, based on the theory of interactive fairness. The result shows that the equilibrium perception parameter of interactive fair game is the only one, when the perception parameter is larger (more than 1 / 2). Can realize more reasonable collection compensation price; When the perception parameter of fairness is smaller (less than 1 / 2), the equilibrium is (low price, accepted). But it can not reverse the situation that the expropriated person faces the real estate expropriation which is accepted at a low price. Therefore, only when the perception parameter of fairness is larger, that is, the expropriator has a higher fairness characteristic. In order to ensure that the expropriated person gets a reasonable levy compensation, however, in the case of low price levy, because of the consideration of fairness, the expropriated person will get higher utility and benefit than under the traditional game.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71171203) 湖南省社会科学院课题湖南省教育科学“十二五”规划2014年度课题资助
【分类号】：F299.23
【正文快照】： 房屋征收机制是我国独有的一项公共政策制度。实践中,房屋征收主要是由房屋征收部门(通常是政府城建部门)在摸底立项的基础上对城镇居民居住房屋的土地使用权的有偿回收。但是,随着我国城镇化建设的快速推进,房地产征收补偿成为了房屋征收背后的重要推手。由于房地产征收补偿

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