电商间协作博弈的联盟形成与利益分配

发布时间：2018-03-16 00:35

本文选题：电商联盟　切入点：近似Shapley值　出处：《云南大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电子商务始于20世纪70年代。随着互联网技术的发展,电子商务也在蓬勃发展。发展至今,电子商务已经改变了人们的消费模式,由传统的实体店消费转变成现在的网上消费。消费者对产品或者服务追求物美价廉的同时,商家也在追求更高的利益。本文所研究的主要问题就是如何基于协作博弈提高商家收益,以及收益如何分配。本文基于协作博弈,让商家结盟也就是形成电商联盟,达到联盟中参与者的收益都有所增加的目的,并使用Shapley值在联盟内部进行收益分配。商家在选择销售平台也就是网站的时候,网站的点击率(CTR, Click-Through Rate)是必不可少的依据。本文假定网站以点击率向商家收取佣金,鉴于商业谈判与竞拍有一定的相似性,我们想到使用VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)机制来构建支付函数。但是VCG机制并不能解决我们要解决的问题,因此我们把VCG机制扩展成E-VCG(Expand-VCG)机制,使用E-VCG构造支付函数。对于合作策略,我们基于协作博弈提出三条约束规则来缩小选择范围。我们使用Shapley值进行收益分配,然而,事实上Shapley值的计算非常麻烦,因此我们提出了近似Shapley的计算方法。概而论之,本文主要研究内容贡献如下：1、基于协作博弈,我们提出了三条规则来提高商家联盟的效率,并且证明了三条规则的合理性。2、我们扩展了VCG机制并提炼出数学表达式来反映商家的支出与收益的关系,并且次扩展是合理的。3、我们提出一个计算近似shapley值的方法,该方法可以在线性时问内得到近似值。4、我们得到商家联盟策略根据我们提出的规则,并作出初步的实验来测试我们的方法的可行性。
[Abstract]:E-commerce began in 1970s. With the development of internet technology, e-commerce is booming. Up to now, e-commerce has changed people's consumption mode. From the traditional physical store consumption to the current online consumption. Consumers pursue good and inexpensive products or services at the same time, The main problem of this paper is how to improve the profits of merchants based on cooperative game, and how to distribute the profits. To achieve the goal of increasing the profits of the participants in the alliance, and use the Shapley value to distribute the benefits within the alliance. CTR (Click-Through rate) is an essential basis for the website. This paper assumes that the website collects commission from the merchant at the click-through rate, in view of the similarity between commercial negotiation and bidding. We thought of using the VCG-Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based mechanism to build a payment function. But the VCG mechanism does not solve the problem we want to solve, so we extend the VCG mechanism to E-VCG-Expand-VCG-based mechanism, and use E-VCG to construct the payment function. We propose three constraint rules based on cooperative game to narrow the selection range. We use the Shapley value for income distribution. However, in fact, the calculation of Shapley value is very troublesome, so we propose a calculation method similar to Shapley. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1. Based on the cooperative game, we propose three rules to improve the efficiency of the business alliance. We extend the VCG mechanism and extract the mathematical expression to reflect the relationship between the business expenditure and the income, and the sub-expansion is reasonable. 3. We propose a method to calculate the approximate shapley value. This method can get approximate value. 4 in linear time. We get the business alliance strategy according to the rules we put forward, and make a preliminary experiment to test the feasibility of our method.
【学位授予单位】：云南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F224.32;F713.36

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