基于激励规制理论的准经营性基础设施项目政府监管研究

发布时间：2018-03-28 11:01

本文选题：准经营性基础设施　切入点：激励规制理论　出处：《重庆大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着城镇化进程的快速发展,城市基础设施的需求量日益增长,政府通过公私合作关系来引入民间资本,缓解政府的财政压力。根据项目区分理论、公共产品理论、可经营性系数理论将城镇基础设施分为三大类,由于准经营性基础设施项目既具有一定的公益性,又具有收费机制和现金流入,私人单位与政府合作的积极性并不高,而且服务效率较低,这些问题严重阻碍了基础设施建设的发展。本文尝试在借助激励规制理论的基础之上,构建准经营性基础设施项目的政府激励规制模型,从而有效的提高政企合作的效率。本文首先对项目区分的相关理论、公私合作理论、政府经济学等理论做了系统阐述,分析了激励规制理论的内涵和政府监管的重要性。其次描述了基础设施项目的现状以及政府监管的现状,提出政府监管体制与政府激励监管存在的问题。政府监管激励规制模型的设计是本文的核心部分,该模型是建立在信息经济学与委托代理理论的基础上,构建政府效益最大化函数,私人单位参与约束函数与激励相容函数,通过最值求解分析政府最优激励系数,采取最优契约来实现政府激励。最后提出了实现政府激励机制的策略,本文从政府监管的体系设计和激励规制机制设计两个方向入手,政府监管体系设计包含政府监管机构设置、立法建设、准入制度、过程中的价格、服务质量、退出机制、后评价制度以及信息平台和公众参与平台设置等方面的内容;激励规制机制设计从监管者和被监管者角度提出了具体的策略。完善的监管激励策略能促进项目高效率、稳定的运行,提高企业效率与服务水平,实现政府、企业、公众三方共赢。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of urbanization, the demand for urban infrastructure is increasing day by day. The government introduces private capital through public-private partnership to alleviate the financial pressure of the government. According to the theory of project differentiation, the theory of public goods, The theory of operational coefficient divides urban infrastructure into three categories. Due to the fact that quasi-operational infrastructure projects have not only public welfare, but also charging mechanism and cash inflow, the enthusiasm of private units to cooperate with the government is not high. These problems seriously hinder the development of infrastructure construction. Based on the theory of incentive regulation, this paper attempts to construct the government incentive regulation model of quasi-operational infrastructure projects. In order to effectively improve the efficiency of cooperation between government and enterprise. Firstly, this paper systematically expounds the related theories of project differentiation, public-private cooperation theory, government economics and so on. This paper analyzes the connotation of incentive regulation theory and the importance of government supervision. Secondly, it describes the current situation of infrastructure projects and the current situation of government regulation. The key part of this paper is the design of government regulatory incentive regulation model, which is based on the theory of information economics and principal-agent theory. The government benefit maximization function, the private unit participation constraint function and the incentive compatibility function are constructed, and the optimal incentive coefficient of the government is analyzed by solving the optimal value. Finally, this paper puts forward the strategies to realize the government incentive mechanism. This paper starts with the system design of government supervision and the design of incentive regulation mechanism. The design of government supervision system includes the establishment of government supervision institution, legislation construction, access system, price in the process, service quality, exit mechanism, post-evaluation system, information platform and public participation platform. The design of incentive regulation mechanism puts forward specific strategies from the perspective of regulators and supervisors. A perfect regulatory incentive strategy can promote the high efficiency and stable operation of the project, improve the efficiency and service level of enterprises, and realize the government and enterprises. The public wins by three parties.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F299.21;F283

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