准经营性基础设施PPP项目特许期问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 03:05

本文选题：准经营性基础设施项目　切入点：PPP模式　出处：《重庆大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：近三十年来,我国城市化进程明显加快,基础设施的建设需求随之增加。公私合作的PPP模式使大量的民间资金得以进入基础设施领域,为其建设注入了新的能量,缓解了政府部门的资金压力,引入了先进的技术手段和管理方法,提高了基础设施的运作效率。基础设施可以分为经营性、准经营性和非经营性基础设施,其中准经营性基础设施项目具有一定的收费机制,但基于其正外部性,收费价格不能以建设和运作成本为基准,无法完全收回投资,可以运用公共部门和私人部门共同合作的PPP模式进行投资建设。通过特许经营的方式,项目公司从运营项目中获得一定的收入,在特许期满后将项目移交给政府部门。特许期是将公共部门和私人部门各自的权利、义务和职责划分开来的分界线,它的合理确定是特许经营协议中的核心,是保证公私双方权益的关键。目前准经营性基础设施PPP项目特许期的研究还不够完善,针对这个问题,本文的主要研究内容为:首先对基础设施分类的项目区分理论、公共物品理论、可销售性理论进行了分析,界定了准经营性基础设施项目属于准公共物品,具有采用PPP模式进行融资建设的可行性。通过分析国内外研究机构和学者对PPP的定义,界定了本文准经营性基础设施项目PPP模式的内涵,阐述了准经营性基础设施PPP项目的特点,并在此基础上说明研究准经营性基础设施PPP项目特许期的必要性。其次对影响准经营性基础设施PPP项目特许期的几个因素进行描述,分析它们对特许期的作用机制,提出影响因素的确定方法。再次,阐述准经营性基础设施PPP项目特许期决策方法——内部收益率法、净现值法、蒙特卡洛模拟法,对比分析各个方法的优缺点;结合博弈理论和委托-代理理论叙述特许期谈判过程,论证了博弈模型决策法的适用性。最后,建立博弈决策模型,通过算例验证模型的可行性,并针对模型的应用提出建议。
[Abstract]:In the past 30 years, the process of urbanization in China has been accelerated obviously, and the construction demand of infrastructure has increased.The PPP model of public-private partnership enables a large number of private funds to enter the field of infrastructure, injects new energy into its construction, alleviates the pressure on government funds, and introduces advanced technical means and management methods.The operation efficiency of infrastructure is improved.Infrastructure can be divided into operational, quasi-operational and non-operational infrastructure, in which quasi-operational infrastructure projects have a certain charging mechanism, but due to their positive externalities, the price of charges cannot be based on construction and operation costs.Can not fully recover investment, can use the public and private sector cooperation of the PPP model for investment and construction.Through franchising, the project company obtains certain revenue from the operation project and hands over the project to the government after the expiration of the concession.The concession period is the dividing line between the rights, obligations and duties of the public sector and the private sector. Its reasonable determination is the core of the franchise agreement and the key to the protection of the rights and interests of both public and private parties.At present, the research on the concession period of quasi-operational infrastructure PPP project is not perfect. In view of this problem, the main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, the theory of project differentiation, the theory of public goods, the theory of classification of infrastructure, and the theory of public goods.The theory of marketability is analyzed, and the quasi-operational infrastructure project is defined as quasi-public goods, which has the feasibility of financing construction with PPP model.By analyzing the definition of PPP by domestic and foreign research institutions and scholars, this paper defines the connotation of PPP model of quasi-operational infrastructure projects, and expounds the characteristics of quasi-operational infrastructure PPP projects.On the basis of this, the necessity of studying the concession period of quasi-operational infrastructure PPP project is explained.Secondly, several factors affecting the concession period of quasi-operational infrastructure PPP project are described, the mechanism of their effects on the concession period is analyzed, and the method of determining the influencing factors is put forward.Thirdly, the paper expounds the concession decision methods of quasi-operating infrastructure PPP projects, such as internal rate of return method, net present value method, Monte Carlo simulation method, and compares and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each method.Combining the game theory and the principal-agent theory, the franchise negotiation process is described, and the applicability of the game model decision method is demonstrated.Finally, a game decision model is established, and the feasibility of the model is verified by an example, and some suggestions for its application are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F283

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