政府投资代建制项目有效监管及风险防范的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-04-07 15:46

本文选题：政府投资项目　切入点：代建制　出处：《大连交通大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：政府投资项目多为公益性项目且作为我国固定资产投资的重要组成部分,其取得良好的社会效益成为了项目建设的主要目的。然而,政府投资项目在建设的过程中,由于监管方式的不规范与体制的不完善使得项目面临着各种不同程度的风险,如“钓鱼工程”,“三超”等,这不仅损害了政府的投资效益同时也损害了整个社会的公共利益。为此国务院出台了对政府投资项目实施“代建制”的决定,代建制实现了工程项目“投资、建设、监管、使用”的四位分离,有效地避免了工程项目建设中的风险。但代建制管理模式下所形成的委托代理关系也相应增加“新风险”发生的机率,制约着政府投资项目良好效益的取得。为此,对代建制下政府投资项目进行有效的监管及风险防范成为了影响代建市场发展以及投资项目取得良好效益的重要因素。在此背景下,如何通过建立科学的风险防范机制以及采取有效的监管方式,降低代建项目风险的损失,提高政府投资项目建设管理水平和投资效益,成为了值得研究的问题。首先,介绍了本文研究的背景、目的及意义,对国内外相关研究进行分析,提出本研究问题,指明本研究所用的方法,给出研究结构;接着,对政府投资代建制项目的监管及风险防范进行理论分析,介绍政府投资项目以及代建制的概念与内涵并指出政府投资代建制项目监管与风险防范的必要性,明确了影响有效监管的风险因素,阐述主要的支撑理论;第三,对政府投资代建制项目监管与风险防范的机理进行研究,主要分析了监管过程中存在的问题、风险产生的机理,明确风险防范的类型;第四,针对政府投资代建制项目的逆向选择风险进行博弈研究,建立招标的博弈模型并对主要的参数进行分析,提出防范风险的监管策略;第五,针对政府投资代建制项目委托方道德风险问题进行博弈研究,在证明了激励机制可行性的基础上,设计锦标制度对委托方的道德风险进行防范,提出监管策略;第六,针对政府投资代建制项目代建方道德风险问题进行博弈分析,分别进行显性激励机制与隐性激励机制的设计,通过对主要参数分析以及算例检验,得出防范道德风险的监管策略;最后,结论与展望,总结本次研究的主要研究成果,并提出本次研究的局限和对后续研究的展望。通过对政府投资代建制项目进行有效监管及风险防范的研究,有助于丰富相关理论的应用,提高政府投资代建制项目的监管水平,对于推动我国政府投资代建制项目发展具有重要的研究价值和实际意义。
[Abstract]:Government investment projects are mostly public welfare projects and as an important part of fixed assets investment in China, the main purpose of project construction is to obtain good social benefits.However, in the process of construction of government investment projects, due to the non-standard supervision and imperfect system, the project faces various risks, such as "fishing project", "Sanchao" and so on.This not only damages the investment benefit of the government, but also the public interest of the whole society.As a result, the State Council has issued a decision to implement the "agent system" for government investment projects, which realizes the separation of the four positions of "investment, construction, supervision and use" and effectively avoids the risks in the construction of engineering projects.However, the principal-agent relationship formed under the mode of agent management also increases the probability of "new risk", which restricts the good benefit of government investment projects.Therefore, the effective supervision and risk prevention of the government investment projects under the agent construction system has become an important factor affecting the development of the agency construction market and the good benefit of the investment projects.In this context, how to establish a scientific risk prevention mechanism and adopt effective supervision to reduce the risk loss, improve the level of government investment project construction management and investment efficiency, has become a problem worthy of study.Firstly, this paper introduces the background, purpose and significance of this study, analyzes the related research at home and abroad, puts forward the research problems, points out the methods used in this study, and gives the research structure.This paper makes a theoretical analysis on the supervision and risk prevention of the government investment agency project, introduces the concept and connotation of the government investment project and the agent system, and points out the necessity of the supervision and risk prevention of the government investment agent system project.It clarifies the risk factors that affect the effective supervision, and expounds the main supporting theory. Thirdly, it studies the mechanism of supervision and risk prevention of government investment agent construction projects, mainly analyzes the problems existing in the process of supervision and the mechanism of risk generation.Make clear the type of risk prevention; fourth, the risk of adverse selection of government investment agent system project to carry out a game study, establish a bidding game model and analysis of the main parameters, put forward the risk prevention supervision strategy; fifth,On the basis of proving the feasibility of incentive mechanism, this paper designs the gold medal system to guard against the moral hazard of the proxy project and puts forward the supervision strategy.Based on the game analysis of the moral hazard of the agent in the government investment agent construction project, the explicit incentive mechanism and the implicit incentive mechanism are designed, and the main parameters are analyzed and the examples are tested.Finally, the conclusion and prospect, summarize the main research results of this study, and put forward the limitations of this study and future research prospects.Through the effective supervision and risk prevention research on the government investment agent system project, it is helpful to enrich the application of relevant theories and improve the supervision level of the government investment agent system project.It has important research value and practical significance for promoting the development of agent construction project invested by our government.
【学位授予单位】：大连交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F283;F224.32

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