纵向差异产品下价格领导制对默契合谋的影响

发布时间：2018-06-22 09:51

本文选题：纵向差异产品 + 价格领导制　；参考：《财经问题研究》2016年07期

【摘要】：价格领导制对合谋的作用机理一直是产业组织理论关注和争议的焦点。本文以纵向差异产品模型为基础,构建一个扩展的双寡头无限期重复博弈模型,首先求出竞争状态下价格领导制的均衡利润,其次利用纳什讨价还价解求出合谋下的企业利润,最后通过比较同时定价和价格领导制两种情形下企业维持合谋的激励,重点考察纵向差异产品下价格领导行为对默契合谋的作用机理。研究发现,如果企业可以采用价格领导制进行价格合谋,则无论是哪家企业作为价格领导者,价格领导制都极大降低了领导者背叛合谋的激励,增强了合谋的稳定性,尤其是在高质量产品企业作为合谋的价格领导者之时。对此,笔者建议反垄断执法机构关注企业的序贯提价行为,发现潜藏在其中的合谋行为。
[Abstract]:The mechanism of price leadership on collusion has always been the focus of industry organization theory. Based on the vertical differential product model, this paper constructs an extended duopoly indefinite repeated game model. Firstly, the equilibrium profit of price leadership is obtained under competition, and secondly, the profit of collusive enterprises is obtained by Nash bargaining solution. Finally, by comparing the incentive of enterprises to maintain collusion under the conditions of simultaneous pricing and price leadership, the mechanism of price leadership on tacit collusion under vertical differential products is investigated. The study found that if the price leadership system can be used for price collusion, no matter who is the price leader, the price leadership system greatly reduces the incentive for the leader to betray collusion and enhances the stability of collusion. Especially in the high-quality product enterprises as collusive price leaders. In response, the author suggests that antitrust law enforcement agencies should pay attention to the sequential price increase of enterprises and find out the collusion hidden in it.
【作者单位】：福建农林大学管理学院;东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“经营者集中反垄断审查中的经济证据研究”(11YJCZH189)
【分类号】：F224.32

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