信息不对称下企业低碳发展的激励契约设计

发布时间：2018-06-23 17:16

本文选题：单一信息不对称 + 双重信息不对称　；参考：《中国科技论坛》2016年11期

【摘要】：企业低碳减排中的低碳技术和减排努力程度属于私有信息时,政府需要甄别其碳减排的真实能力并对其减排努力实施有效的激励。针对上述问题,运用博弈论和激励机制理论,建立了逆向选择与道德风险并存且企业低碳技术为连续类型下的企业低碳发展的激励契约;对比分析了只存在道德风险单一信息不对称的情况,并通过数值仿真进行了验证。结果表明:双重信息不对称时,政府的期望收益减少,企业的减排努力程度降低而收益增加;政府应针对不同技术类型的企业设计差异化的契约激励模式,不但可以起到自我选择的甄别作用,还能诱导企业提高低碳努力程度。
[Abstract]:When the enterprises' low-carbon technology and the extent of emission reduction efforts are private information, the government needs to identify their true ability to reduce carbon emissions and to implement effective incentives for their efforts to reduce carbon emissions. In order to solve the above problems, using game theory and incentive mechanism theory, the incentive contract of low carbon development of enterprises with low carbon technology is established under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard. The single information asymmetry of moral hazard is analyzed and verified by numerical simulation. The results show that under the condition of double information asymmetry, the expected income of the government decreases, the enterprise reduces the effort to reduce emissions, and the revenue increases, and the government should design the differentiated contract incentive model for different technology types of enterprises. Not only can play a self-selection role, but also can induce enterprises to improve low-carbon efforts.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金“基于异质性主体行为的产业集群低碳演化模型及其仿真研究”(71271159) 国家社科重大基金“全面深化改革视阈下社会治理体制与机制创新研究”(14ZDA062) 国家社科基金项目“战略性新兴产业集群生态创新机理及其生态创新政策研究”(2014CJY002)
【分类号】：F224;X32;F272

【相似文献】