基础设施建设PFI模式核心利益相关者的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-06-23 14:09

本文选题：PFI模式 + 利益相关者　；参考：《重庆工商大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国社会经济的突飞猛进,基础设施建设的需求与日俱增,为缓解城市化基础设施建设压力,政府部门提高了公共基础设施项目的建设力度。由于政府部门的财政资金短缺,为解决地方的债务危机,各级政府纷纷借助民间资本力量,通过合资或承包的方式将基础建设项目外包给私营部门或私人财团。在众多的私企代建制模式下,相比其它模式,PFI(私人主动融资)模式的运行机制更加灵活,实行全面的代理制度,因此风险也较大。针对PFI模式的这一优缺点,在分析PFI模式各利益主体间的委托代理关系及诸多代理问题基础之上,研究了核心利益相关者的博弈并建立PFI模式核心利益相关者的激励约束。本文基于PFI模式概述及PFI模式中核心利益相关者的界定；从合同关系上分析了具体签署的合同类型；阐述了PFI模式中利益主体间的委托代理关系及代理中的违规、“消极”、“寻租”等问题。在此基础上,针对有效监管问题构建了政府与PFI项目公司、项目管理单位与承包商的两组监督博弈；针对PFI模式中存在的两种“寻租”行为,构建了PFI项目公司与承包商的寻租三方博弈,给出了三者的最优行为策略,构建项目管理单位与承包商的“寻租”的三方博弈,从政府角度提出防寻租的有效措施。为了引导代理人的行为、规避违规、“寻租”等风险问题、确保项目的有效运转、实现项目的整体利益最大化,本文在第五章从政府角度建立了PFI模式核心利益相关者的激励约束。考虑到如何引导代理人行为向整体利益靠拢,在激励约束上,分别从最优激励合同、声誉激励、监督约束、制度约束做出分析。在最优激励合同机制设计上,提出最优激励系数的设计、风险的合理分配、激励强度的控制三方面的建议；在声誉激励部分,建议政府建立有关代理人的优秀声誉企业、“黑名单”名录库,利用声誉形成代理人的自我约束；约束方面,采用监督约束和制度约束,本文认为健全法律法规,结合具体事项特殊监督及市场监督才是长期有效的监督约束方式；通过激励约束方面的研究,为PFI模式核心利益相关者的长期稳定发展提供了实际参考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of social economy in our country, the demand for infrastructure construction is increasing day by day. In order to alleviate the pressure of urbanization infrastructure construction, government departments have enhanced the construction of public infrastructure projects. In order to solve the local debt crisis, governments at all levels use private capital to outsource infrastructure projects to the private sector or private consortia by means of joint ventures or contracts. Compared with other modes, the operating mechanism of PFI (Private active financing) mode is more flexible, and the overall agency system is implemented, so the risk is higher. In view of the advantages and disadvantages of PFI model, based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship and many agency problems among the stakeholders in PFI model, the game of core stakeholders is studied and the incentive constraints of core stakeholders in PFI model are established. Based on the outline of PFI model and the definition of core stakeholders in PFI model, this paper analyzes the specific contract types in terms of contract relationship, expounds the principal-agent relationship among stakeholders and the violation of agency in PFI mode, "negative". Rent-seeking and other issues. On this basis, this paper constructs two groups of supervisory game between government and PFI project company, project management unit and contractor, aiming at two kinds of "rent-seeking" behavior in PFI mode. This paper constructs a tripartite rent-seeking game between the PFI project company and the contractor, gives the optimal behavior strategy of the three, constructs the tripartite game between the project management unit and the contractor, and puts forward effective measures to prevent rent-seeking from the angle of the government. In order to guide the agent's behavior, avoid the risk problems, such as violation, rent seeking and so on, ensure the effective operation of the project, and realize the maximization of the overall benefit of the project. In the fifth chapter, the incentive constraints of the core stakeholders in the PFI model are established from the point of view of the government. In consideration of how to guide agent behavior towards the overall interests, this paper analyzes the incentive constraints from the optimal incentive contract, reputation incentive, supervisory constraint and institutional constraint. In the design of optimal incentive contract mechanism, the author puts forward three suggestions: the design of optimal incentive coefficient, the reasonable distribution of risk, and the control of incentive intensity, and in the part of reputation incentive, it is suggested that the government should establish the excellent reputation enterprise of the relevant agent. In the "blacklist" list, the reputation is used to form the self-restraint of the agent. In the aspect of restraint, the supervision and the system are adopted, and the author thinks that the laws and regulations should be improved. The combination of specific items special supervision and market supervision is a long-term effective supervision and constraint mode. Through the research on incentive and constraint it provides a practical reference for the long-term stable development of PFI model core stakeholders.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F283

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