多任务目标视角下PPP项目激励问题与模型构建

发布时间：2018-09-04 05:39

【摘要】：针对PPP项目中投资方任务目标的多维性,研究了政府方激励机制的设计问题。研究发现,当投资方的成本函数相互独立时,政府方的激励也是独立的;而当投资方的成本函数相互依存时,政府方的激励方式取决于投资方的行为结果是否可以直接观测。若投资方的行为结果是不可观测的,那么政府方对于该行为的激励是独立的;若投资方的行为结果是可直接观测的,则政府方对于该行为的激励方式取决于该行为的成本函数与不可观测的行为活动的成本函数之间的依存关系。
[Abstract]:In view of the multidimensional nature of the investor's task objectives in PPP projects, this paper studies the design of government incentive mechanism. It is found that when the cost functions of the investor are independent of each other, the government's incentive mechanism is independent, and when the cost functions of the investor are interdependent, the government's incentive mode depends on whether the investor's behavior results. If the behavior result of the investor is unobservable, the government's incentive to the behavior is independent; if the behavior result of the investor is observable, the government's incentive to the behavior depends on the dependence between the cost function of the behavior and the cost function of the unobservable behavior. Keep the relationship.
【作者单位】：南京大学工程管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390521)
【分类号】：F283

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