中国食品安全规制绩效评价与优化路径

发布时间：2018-10-14 09:11

【摘要】：食品安全不仅关系到广大人民群众的身体健康,还关系到经济社会的健康发展。当前中国食品安全事故频发,不断打击着广大人民群众对食品安全的信心。随着食品安全问题的日益严重性,政府监管部门采取多种规制措施保障食品安全,但从实施效果看,食品安全问题事故频发的势头虽然得到一定遏制,但整体形势依然十分严峻。有效解决食品安全问题,重塑消费者信心,任重道远。本文运用规制经济学、信息经济学、博弈论、计量经济学等相关理论,采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法对中国食品安全规制绩效与优化路径进行了深入的分析。本文的研究思路如下:首先,提出政府规制是一种特殊的公共物品,并探讨了政府规制的特征与供需静态均衡,借鉴德鲁克与罗宾斯的管理学相关理论,运用规制效果与规制效率两个指标评价食品安全政府规制绩效;其次,从整个食品供应链条出发,基于政府规制机构、食品生产企业、消费者三个博弈主体的利益考虑,建立了以中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与食品生产企业、生产企业与生产企业、生产企业与消费者为参与人的四组动态博弈模型,从理论层面分析了影响中国食品安全规制绩效的因素;再次,选取规制效果与规制效率两个指标对中国的食品安全规制绩效进行评价。在对食品安全规制效果进行评价时,采用VAR模型实证检验中国食品安全规制效果,并进行了脉冲响应分析与方差分解;在对食品安全规制效率进行评价时,以数据包络分析法(DEA)为分析工具,从生产效率的视角对我国1997-2012年的食品安全规制效率进行了研究,并在第二阶段通过Tobit模型对影响规制效率的因素进行了分析,并对第三章博弈分析中的结论进行了验证。最后,本文在理论分析与实证研究基础上提出中国食品安全规制优化路径。得出的主要结论为:(1)食品安全规制涉及诸多利益主体,利益主体之间博弈的结果会影响食品安全规制效果。规制部门加大对违规食品生产企业的处罚力度,增加其违规成本,再加之声誉损失,企业选择生产安全食品的概率就会增大。消费者胜诉的概率越大,获得的赔偿额越多,企业越有可能选择生产合格食品;(2)在长期,监督频次和处罚户次数的增加以及食品行业劳动力素质的提高均可以提高食品抽检合格率,提高食品安全规制效果,而食品工业产量的增加则降低了食品安全规制效果。此外,规制机构处罚户次数的增加对食品抽检合格率预测方差的影响最大;(3)我国食品安全规制综合效率偏低,并且主要是由纯技术效率水平低下和参差不齐造成的,2009年以后食品安全政府规制总体效率要高于2009以前的水平。从制度性因素看,规制立法变量的变动可以促进食品安全政府规制效率的提高,而规制机构变量的作用则相反;同时食品工业劳动力素质的提高可以提高食品安全规制效率;从规制行为看,增加监督频次与处罚户次数可以提高食品安全规制效率。
[Abstract]:Food safety concerns not only the health of the masses, but also the economic and social development. China's food safety accidents are frequent, and the people's confidence in food safety is constantly being combated. With the increasing seriousness of food safety problem, the government supervision department takes a variety of regulation measures to guarantee the food safety, but from the implementation effect, the trend of frequent accidents of food safety has been restrained, but the overall situation is still very serious. To effectively solve food safety problems, rebuild consumer confidence, have a long way to go. This paper applies the theory of regulation economics, information economics, game theory, econometrics and so on, and makes an in-depth analysis of China's food safety regulation performance and optimization path by means of normative analysis and empirical analysis. First of all, the paper puts forward that government regulation is a special public goods, and probes into the characteristics of government regulation and the static equilibrium of supply and demand, and draws on Drucker's theory of management related to Robbins. Secondly, starting from the whole food supply chain strip, based on the interests of three game bodies of government regulation mechanism, food production enterprises and consumers, the central government and local government have been established. The local government and the food production enterprises, the production enterprises and the production enterprises, the production enterprises and the consumers are four groups of dynamic game models of the participants, the factors influencing the performance of China's food safety regulation are analyzed from the theoretical level, and again, The paper evaluates the performance of food safety regulation in China by selecting two indexes of regulation effect and regulation efficiency. In order to evaluate the effect of food safety regulation, VAR model is used to empirically test the effect of China's food safety regulation, and impulse response analysis and variance decomposition are carried out. In order to evaluate the efficiency of food safety regulation, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used as the analysis tool. The efficiency of food safety regulation in China from 1997 to 2012 was studied from the perspective of production efficiency, and the factors affecting the regulation efficiency were analyzed in the second stage through the Tobit model, and the conclusion of the third-chapter game analysis was verified. Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper puts forward the optimization path of China's food safety regulation. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) The food safety regulation involves many interests subjects, and the result of game between interests subject will affect the food safety regulation effect. The regulation department increases the punishment strength to the illegal food production enterprise, increases its illegal cost, and adds the reputation loss, and the probability that the enterprise chooses to produce the safety food will increase. The greater the probability of winning the consumer, the more the compensation awarded, the more likely the enterprise may choose to produce the qualified food; (2) the increase in the frequency of supervision and the number of punishments and the improvement of the quality of the labor force in the long-term period can improve the qualification rate of the spot check of the food, the food safety regulation effect is improved, and the food industry yield is increased, and the food safety regulation effect is reduced. In addition, the increase of the number of penalty households in the regulatory body has the greatest influence on the prediction variance of the qualification rate of food sampling, and (3) the comprehensive efficiency of food safety regulation in China is low. and the overall efficiency of food safety government regulation after 2009 is higher than before 2009. From the institutional factors, the change of regulation legislative variable can promote the improvement of the regulation efficiency of food safety government, but the function of regulation mechanism variable is opposite; meanwhile, the improvement of labor quality of food industry can improve the efficiency of food safety regulation; from the regulation behavior, Increasing supervision frequency and number of penalty households can improve the efficiency of food safety regulation.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F203

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