委托-代理关系下农业工人的劳动防护问题研究

发布时间：2018-11-16 20:37

【摘要】：本文是在当代农业的生产效率快速提高、农业生产环境不断恶劣的背景下,研究农业生产工人在保护健康方面存在的"道德风险"问题。以往文献中对工人在保护健康方面的道德风险问题主要是从保险合同的角度来考虑。本文从一个新的视角来研究工人在采取防护措施以保护健康时存在的道德风险问题。根据经典的委托代理理论,尽管使用企业提供的防护设备被证明能够显著降低工作环境对健康的危害,但由于使用防护设备努力的成本由工人承担,同时由此带来的受益无法被工人独享,所以农业工人采用防护设备的努力水平低于最优水平,因此存在道德风险问题。本文通过研究美国猪肉生产企业数据,验证了在存在雇用关系的企业中确实存在"道德风险"问题。其工人佩戴防护设备的概率比不存在雇用关系的企业中的工人低10%;由于工人生病带来了边际劳动生产率下降,雇主为了应对道德风险,在实践中采用了激励合同来激励工人进行防护。我们的实证结果与理论预期一致。
[Abstract]:This paper is to study the "moral hazard" of agricultural workers in protecting their health under the background of rapid improvement of agricultural production efficiency and worsening agricultural production environment. In the past, the moral hazard of workers in health protection was mainly considered from the perspective of insurance contract. This paper studies the moral hazard of workers in taking protective measures to protect their health from a new perspective. According to the classical principal-agent theory, although the use of protective equipment provided by the enterprise has been shown to significantly reduce health hazards in the working environment, the cost of using protective equipment efforts is borne by workers. At the same time, the benefits can not be exclusive to the workers, so the level of efforts of agricultural workers to use protective equipment is lower than the optimal level, so there is a moral hazard problem. By studying the data of pork production enterprises in the United States, this paper verifies the existence of "moral hazard" in the enterprises with employment relationship. Their workers are 10 times less likely to wear protective equipment than workers in enterprises where there is no employment relationship; In order to deal with moral hazard, employers have adopted incentive contracts in practice to encourage workers to protect themselves because of the decline in marginal labor productivity caused by workers' illness. Our empirical results are consistent with theoretical expectations.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学中国人力资本与劳动经济研究中心;中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院;美国爱荷华州立大学经济系;
【基金】：中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划“中国低生育率的微观决策和宏观政策研究” 国家自然科学基金项目“人口预期寿命、退休政策如何影响职业选择——基于中国人力资本投资的视角”(项目编号:71403303)
【分类号】：F323.6;F249.2

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