双渠道下制造商返利策略选择与渠道协调合同设计

发布时间：2018-01-09 12:08

本文关键词：双渠道下制造商返利策略选择与渠道协调合同设计　出处：《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电子商务和第三方物流的快速发展,使得越来越多的制造商在传统渠道的基础上开设电子渠道,运用电子渠道与传统零售渠道相结合的双渠道分销模式销售产品以扩大市场竞争力,这已经成为众多商家关注的首要问题之一。然而,这种双渠道运营不仅加剧制造商与零售商之间的冲突,还导致电子渠道与传统渠道之间的冲突。在电子商务销售机会和巨大利润面前,大部分的制造商都不愿意放弃电子渠道,而是不断寻求与零售商的合作方式,设法消除与零售商的正面冲突以达到双赢的局面。事实上,制造商返利是改善制造商和零售商合作关系的一种方式,通过返利可以激发零售商销售的积极性,提高企业的运作效率。然而,在双渠道环境下制造商返利策略的选择不仅受到传统渠道中制造商和零售商关系的影响,还受到电子渠道和传统渠道关系的影响。所以,双渠道下制造商返利策略的分析将更加复杂。鉴于这些,本论文对双渠道下的制造商返利模式进行研究。首先,在顾客返利具有兑现成本的假设下,构建了双渠道下制造商和零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过价格传递效率和制造商利润最大化两个方面对比制造商返利策略的选择。研究结果表明,制造商开设电子渠道,通过降低电子渠道产品价格,能够提高返利策略的价格传递；并且在双渠道下制造商若基于价格传递效率来选择返利策略,应充分了解市场交叉弹性,在高交叉弹性下选择销售返利,低交叉弹性下选择顾客返利；制造商若基于自身利益最大化选择返利策略,高顾客兑换率下制造商将选择销售返利,低顾客兑换率下选择顾客返利。其次,通过引入零售商风险规避,进一步探讨双渠道下零售商风险规避对制造商返利选择的影响。研究发现,双渠道背景下制造商有效识别零售商的风险规避态度能够避免过度返利补偿。此外,制造商无论从价格传递效率出发还是从自身利润最大化出发选择返利策略,在零售商低风险规避时都应选择顾客返利,在零售商高风险规避时应选择销售返利,但两种情形下基准风险规避度的阈值有所不同。最后,基于两部定价思想,探讨在销售返利和顾客返利下制造商双渠道协调合同的设计。研究表明,两部定价和服务补偿合同的组合运用能够实现制造商返利策略(即销售返利和顾客返利)下双渠道供应链有效协调,但在销售返利下需要对两部定价合同进行改进。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of electronic commerce and the third party logistics, more and more manufacturers to open electronic channels based on traditional channels, the use of dual channel electronic channel and traditional retail channels combined the distribution pattern of sales product to expand market competitiveness, it has become one of the primary problems of many businesses concerned. However, this kind of dual channel operation not only aggravate the conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer, but also lead to conflicts between electronic channels and traditional channels. In the face of e-commerce sales opportunities and huge profits, most of the manufacturers are not willing to give up the electronic channels, but continue to seek cooperation with retailers, try to eliminate confrontation with retailers in order to achieve a win-win situation in fact., manufacturer rebate is a way to improve the cooperation between manufacturer and retailer, the retailer can stimulate the sales rebate The enthusiasm, improve the operational efficiency of the enterprise. However, the manufacturer rebate in dual channel environment selection is not only influenced by the relationship between manufacturers and retailers in the traditional channels, but also affected by the electronic channel and traditional channel relationship. Therefore, the dual channel manufacturers back analysis and strategy will be more complicated. In view of these studies. The thesis of the dual channel of manufacturer rebate.
First of all, the customer has cash rebate cost under the assumption that the constructed Stackelberg game model between the two channels of manufacturer and retailer, the price transmission efficiency and to maximize the profits of manufacturers are compared in two aspects of manufacturer rebate strategies. The results show that the manufacturers offering electronic channels, electronic channels by reducing the price of products, can improve the rebate the strategy of price transmission; and in the dual channel manufacturer if the price transfer efficiency to select rebate strategy based on cross elasticity should fully understand the market, choose a sales rebate in high cross elasticity, low cross elasticity rebate customer choice; if manufacturers to maximize their own interests selection strategy based on customer rebate, high exchange rate under the manufacturer will choose sales rebate, low customer exchange rate under customer rebates.
Secondly, through the introduction of risk averse retailer, to further explore the dual channel retailer under risk aversion impacts on the choice of manufacturer rebate. The study found that the dual channel under the background of risk averse retailer manufacturer identification to avoid excessive rebate compensation. In addition, manufacturers in terms of price transfer efficiency of choice or rebates from their own profit maximization based on low risk aversion retailers should choose customer rebates, retailers in high risk aversion should choose a sales rebate, but two case benchmark risk aversion thresholds are different.
Finally, the two part pricing based on the design of double channel coordination contract manufacturers in the rebate and consumer rebate. Research shows that the combination of the two pricing and service compensation contract can achieve manufacturer rebate policies (i.e. rebate and consumer rebate) effective coordination of dual channel supply chain, but under retailer rebate the two part pricing contract was improved.

【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224.32;F713.3

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