民间借贷抵押担保机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-26 04:44

  本文关键词： 民间借贷 抵押担保 社会关系网络 声誉 信号传递　出处：《宁波大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：面对农户缺乏抵押物以及抵押物与金融机构的要求不匹配的现状，民间借贷是如何防范风险的？在经济和社会转型期，民间借贷存在的基础和条件发生了变化，传统的以血缘、地缘为基础的强关系网络逐渐向以学缘、业缘为基础的不稳定的弱关系网络过渡，民间借贷是如何应对这些变化的？鉴于此，本文从抵押担保降低借贷交易风险视角出发，认为只要能发挥信息形成和违约惩罚作用的，都可以充当借贷交易中的担保物，即担保替代，从而不必要求实物资产作抵押，这也与民间借贷一般无实物抵押、高履约率的实情相符合。也就是说，民间借贷本身存在着有效的抵押担保替代机制或者说隐性担保机制。 基于村庄治理理论，本文首先构建了完全信息下民间借贷的运行机制模型，在此基础上，放宽抵押担保条件和范围，研究民间借贷在不完全信息下的风险防控机制。基于强、弱社会关系以及主动、被动违约行为的划分，分别研究了社会关系网络在强关系民间借贷中和声誉在弱关系民间借贷中的抵押担保机制；假设社会关系网络机制和声誉机制可以有效抑制主动违约，利用信号传递博弈模型研究了借款者项目投资规模的信号传递效应对被动违约的甄别作用。 本文的主要结论是： 1、只要能发挥信息形成和违约惩罚作用的都可以充当借贷交易中的担保物，即担保替代，，民间借贷的高履约率是因为其内在有效的担保替代机制； 2、民间借贷有三大隐性担保机制，即社会关系网络机制、声誉机制和信号传递机制。社会关系网络机制在强关系民间借贷中发挥着抵押担保作用，声誉机制和借方项目投资规模的信号传递机制在弱关系民间借贷中发挥了抵押担保作用； 3、社会关系网络机制通过当地信息、同伴选择、同伴监督、多边惩罚和关联惩罚机制以及规范、信念和道德治理机制发挥信息形成和违约惩罚作用。声誉机制通过借贷双方不完全信息动态博弈发挥声誉的评价以及声誉的信息形成和违约惩罚作用。信号传递机制通过借款者项目投资规模的信号传递效应发挥信息形成和违约惩罚作用； 4、本文分别研究了三大担保替代机制，但这并不意味着它们是分别独立发挥作用的，实际上这三者是同时发挥作用的，只是在不同类型的民间借贷中占据主导地位的担保机制不同。
[Abstract]:Facing the situation that farmers lack collateral and the requirements of mortgage and financial institutions do not match, how to prevent the risk of private lending? In the period of economic and social transformation, the foundation and conditions of folk lending have changed, and the traditional strong relationship network based on blood and geography has gradually changed to learning. How does private lending cope with these changes in the transition of unstable weak relational networks based on industry fate? In view of this, this paper from the perspective of mortgage guarantee to reduce the risk of lending transactions, think that as long as they can play the role of information formation and default punishment, they can all act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. Thus do not need to ask for real assets as collateral, this also with private loans generally no physical collateral, high compliance rate in line with the truth. That is. Private lending itself has an effective mortgage guarantee alternative mechanism or implicit guarantee mechanism. Based on the theory of village governance, this paper first constructs the operational mechanism model of private lending under complete information, and on this basis, relax the mortgage guarantee conditions and scope. This paper studies the risk prevention and control mechanism of folk lending under incomplete information. Based on strong, weak social relations and active and passive behavior of breach of contract. This paper studies the mortgage guarantee mechanism of social relationship network in strong relation private loan and reputation in weak relation private loan respectively. Assuming that social network mechanism and reputation mechanism can restrain active default effectively, this paper studies the discriminating effect of signal transfer effect of borrower project investment scale on passive default by using signal transfer game model. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1. As long as they can play the role of information formation and penalty of breach of contract, they can act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. The high performance rate of folk loan is due to its intrinsic and effective guarantee substitution mechanism; 2. There are three implicit guarantee mechanisms in private lending, namely, social network mechanism, reputation mechanism and signal transmission mechanism. Social relationship network mechanism plays a role of mortgage guarantee in strongly related folk lending. The reputation mechanism and the signalling mechanism of the investment scale of the borrower project play the role of mortgage guarantee in the weak relation private loan; 3, social network mechanism through local information, peer selection, peer supervision, multilateral punishment and association punishment mechanisms and norms. The mechanism of belief and moral governance plays the role of information formation and punishment of breach of contract. Reputation mechanism plays the role of reputation evaluation and information formation and punishment of breach of contract through dynamic game of incomplete information between the two parties. The mechanism plays the role of information formation and penalty of default through the signalling effect of borrower project investment scale; 4. This paper studies the three major security substitution mechanisms, but this does not mean that they are acting independently, in fact, these three play a role at the same time. Only in different types of private lending in the dominant position of the guarantee mechanism is different.
【学位授予单位】：宁波大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4;F224

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