政治关系与房地产企业拖欠土地增值税行为

发布时间：2018-02-21 22:32

本文关键词： 政治关系房地产企业土地增值税欠税模型　出处：《产经评论》2015年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：当前土地增值税按超率累增税率30%-60%征收,对于房地产企业是非常大的开发成本,企业存在强烈的动机规避这项支出。而土地增值税属于地方税种,政府是企业在税收活动中的最大利益相关者,房企建立良好的政治关系能够帮助企业得到拖欠税额的制度外优惠。通过建立企业欠税模型,以128家上市房地产企业为例,实证研究政治关系与土地增值税欠税行为。研究发现上市房地产企业中有政治关系的约占60%,这些房地产企业要比无政治关系的房企每年多拖欠4000万以上的税额。拖欠严重的原因一方面在于房企主观上拖欠动机强烈,另一方面地方政府希望通过默许拖欠行为给予企业制度外税收优惠,从而实现其税收竞争的目的。
[Abstract]:At present, the land value added tax rate is 30% to 60% higher than the cumulative rate, which is a very large development cost for real estate enterprises, and the enterprises have strong motives to avoid this expenditure. And the land value-added tax belongs to the local taxes. The government is the biggest stakeholder of the enterprise in the tax activity. Building a good political relationship between the house and enterprise can help the enterprise get the preferential treatment outside the system of tax arrears. Through the establishment of the enterprise tax arrears model, take 128 listed real estate enterprises as an example. It is found that there are about 60 cases of political relation in listed real estate enterprises, which are more than 40 million more taxes than those without political relation. On the one hand, the serious reason for default lies in the strong motivation of the housing enterprises in subjectively defaulting. On the other hand, the local government hopes to give tax preference outside the enterprise system by acquiescing in default, so as to achieve the goal of tax competition.
【作者单位】：中山大学新华学院;中山大学国际商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“房地产金融资产及衍生物定价与风险管理”(项目编号:71231008,项目主持人:李仲飞);国家自然科学基金项目“中国地方官员配置及绩效研究:基于匹配的省-地级官员数据”(项目编号:71373290,项目主持人:徐现祥) 国家社会科学基金项目“城市化过程中地方政府的土地出让行为研究”(项目编号:13CJY031,项目主持人:张莉) 中山大学高校基本科研业务费专项资金(41000-31610112)
【分类号】：F812.42;F299.23

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