基于钢企纵向一体化程度下的竞争博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-28 19:22

本文选题：寡头矿企 + 铁矿价格　；参考：《技术经济与管理研究》2015年04期

【摘要】：在铁矿石寡头市场供应情况下,钢企的纵向一体化程度又受到产业链上下游企业竞争博弈的影响。文章以博弈论为工具,建立了一个上游矿企寡头供应商和下游纵向一体化钢企的两阶段动态竞争博弈。第一阶段,下游钢企进行Cournot博弈,在无差异生产条件下,钢企一体化程度影响到各自边际成本和产量。第二阶段,在无产量约束或有Bertrand博弈均衡产量为约束条件下,上游寡头矿企之间进行Bertrand寡头博弈,以分析铁矿价格对钢企的一体化程度的影响。最后得出:上游矿企寡头供应商竞争状况决定作为中间产品的铁矿的价格,而铁矿原料的价格又影响到下游钢企一体化程度的趋势变化。从而在今后市场竞争中,为我国钢企获取原料资源以及经营决策提供了参考。
[Abstract]:In the case of iron ore oligopoly market, the degree of vertical integration of steel enterprises is affected by the competition game of upstream and downstream enterprises in the industrial chain. Based on the game theory, this paper establishes a two-stage dynamic competition game between an upstream mine oligarchic supplier and a downstream vertical integrated steel enterprise. In the first stage, the downstream steel enterprises carry out Cournot game, under the condition of no difference production, the degree of integration of steel and enterprise affects their marginal cost and output. In the second stage, under the condition of no yield constraint or Bertrand game equilibrium output constraint, the Bertrand oligopoly game is carried out between the upstream oligopoly enterprises to analyze the influence of iron ore price on the degree of integration of steel enterprises. Finally, it is concluded that the competitive status of the oligarchic suppliers of upstream mining enterprises determines the price of iron ore as intermediate products, and the price of iron ore raw materials affects the trend of the integration degree of downstream steel enterprises. Therefore, in the future market competition, it provides a reference for our steel enterprises to obtain raw material resources and management decisions.
【作者单位】：南京晓庄学院经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(41401630)
【分类号】：F416.31;F224.32

【相似文献】