考虑零售商创新投入的供应链回购契约协调研究

发布时间：2018-05-01 08:16

本文选题：回购契约 + 创新投入　；参考：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济全球化的加深，信息技术的发展，，企业之间的竞争已经发展为供应链之间的竞争。技术创新通过降低成本、创新产品和服务，不断提高企业的综合竞争力，单个企业的创新投入将会使整个供应链受益。但供应链的成员企业对各自追求的目标有不同评价标准，所做的决策往往与供应链整体最大利益相冲突。供应链本身就是需要协调的系统。供应链契约是协调供应链的主要方法，其中，以回购契约最为常见，在供应链契约协调中占据着非常重要的位置。因此，如何通过回购契约来约束和协调供应链成员，以提高供应链整体利益一直是供应链管理研究的热点问题。传统研究中大多假设决策者为完全理性，即决策者总以利益最大化作为决策准则，而行为研究却发现在现实生活中人们往往对公平表现出极大关注，即公平关切。但关于公平关切行为倾向的供应链契约的研究却是很少。本文在分析和总结大量国内外关于供应链契约协调研究成果的基础上，以一个由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链作为研究对象，讨论了当零售商同时存在创新投入和公平关切行为倾向时回购契约对两级供应链的协调问题。本文首先研究了在零售商创新投入下，供应链在分散决策和集中决策下的最优决策行为。其次，分析了供应商利用回购契约协调供应链的决策过程。通过模型计算，发现回购契约可以实现完美的协调，且零售商创新投入下的回购契约的批发价格、回购价格、最优订货量均大于传统回购契约。进一步，通过算例分析发现，经回购契约协调后，零售商创新投入的整体供应链利润高于决策者不存在创新投入的整体供应链利润。最后考虑了零售商具有不公平厌恶的供应链回购契约协调问题。发现回购契约依然能够实现协调，且与零售商的不公平厌恶程度无关。进一步，通过算例分析发现，随着零售商不利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶程度的增加，零售商的效用在不断降低，当零售商效用低于其能承受的效用时，零售商会拒绝供应商所提供的回购契约，导致供应链不能实现协调。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of economic globalization and the development of information technology, competition among enterprises has developed into competition between supply chains. By reducing costs and innovating products and services, technological innovation can continuously improve the comprehensive competitiveness of enterprises. The innovation input of individual enterprises will benefit the whole supply chain. However, the members of the supply chain have different evaluation criteria for their respective objectives, and the decisions they make often conflict with the best interests of the supply chain as a whole. The supply chain itself is a system that needs to be coordinated. Supply chain contract is the main method to coordinate supply chain, among which buyback contract is the most common one, which occupies a very important position in supply chain contract coordination. Therefore, how to restrict and coordinate supply chain members through repurchase contracts to improve the overall interests of supply chain has always been a hot issue in supply chain management. In the traditional research, it is assumed that the decision-maker is completely rational, that is, the decision-maker always takes the maximization of profits as the decision criterion, but the behavior research finds that people often pay great attention to the fairness in the real life, that is, the fair concern. However, the research on the supply chain contract about the tendency of fair concern behavior is rare. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing a large number of domestic and foreign researches on supply chain contract coordination, this paper takes a two-level supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single retailer as the research object. This paper discusses the coordination of two levels of supply chain by repurchase contract when the retailer has both innovation input and fair concern behavior tendency. In this paper, the optimal decision behavior of supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision is studied. Secondly, the decision process of supply chain coordination by repurchase contract is analyzed. Through the model calculation, it is found that the repo contract can achieve perfect coordination, and the wholesale price, repo price and optimal order quantity of the repurchase contract under the innovation input of the retailer are all larger than the traditional repo contract. Further, through the example analysis, it is found that after the repurchase contract coordination, the overall supply chain profit of the retailer innovation input is higher than that of the decision maker without innovation input. Finally, the supply chain repurchase contract coordination problem of retailers with unfair aversion is considered. It is found that the repurchase contract can still be coordinated and has nothing to do with the retailer's unfair aversion. Further, through the example analysis, it is found that with the increase of unfavorable unfair aversion and favorable unfair aversion, the retailer's utility is decreasing, when the retailer's utility is lower than it can bear. Retailers reject repo contracts offered by suppliers, resulting in uncoordinated supply chains.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F713.32;F274;F224

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