当前位置:主页 > 经济论文 > 经济管理论文 >

建设项目管理激励机制研究

发布时间:2018-05-01 11:33

  本文选题:建设项目管理 + 委托代理关系 ; 参考:《山东建筑大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:在现代项目管理领域中,业主和其他的项目参与方通过签订合同形成了“委托一代理”关系。但是,在这种关系下,业主和其他的参与方的目标各不相同,并且存在着利益冲突。由于双方的信息不对称,将会引发道德风险问题,即其他的参与方会因为其自身利益考虑而做出损害业主利益的行为。因此,业主应建立适当的激励机制来驱使其他参与方帮助自己实现项目目标。 在研究过程中综合运用的组织行为学、博弈论与信息经济学、项目管理理论中的“激励理论”、“委托代理理论”等理论,针对项目各参与方(设计单位、承包商、专业咨询单位、供应商、监理单位等)在质量、进度、安全和费用四个方面的表现进行分析,选取其中有关激励的因素进行研究。这四个方面是项目管理中非常重要的四个目标,因此针对这四个方面进行研究能够提高激励的有效性。 在质量管理方面首先确定影响质量的因素和各项目参与方在质量管理过程中的责任,业主根据各参与方质量管理的绩效进行激励。并且通过决策树建立了数学模型并对模型求解,研究业主是否应该进行全过程质量控制。 在进度控制方面,研究的目的是在保证质量、不增加人力和物力的前提下,尽量缩短工期的方法。在研究过程中,引入了网络图,确定了最低费用曲线,通过对网络图的计算主要解决了以下问题,是否应该压缩工期,应该压缩哪道或者哪些工序的工期以及如何确定激励强度的问题。 在安全管理的方面,确定要落实安全生产责任制,各参与方要进行安全教育与培训,并且要进行安全检查。在项目建设过程中及项目完成后,业主要根据参与方在安全管理中的表现进行评价,根据评价结果对其进行激励。 在费用控制方面,主要对有关的激励机制报酬方案的确定进行研究。在研究中,以委托代理理论为基础,建立了业主的收益函数和约束条件,并且引入了一个外部环境变量,从而降低了错误激励的可能,提高激励的有效性。此外,将其他参与方的收益分为两部分,固定部分与激励部分,固定部分是不随项目的实际费用而发生改变的,而激励部分则要根据项目的实际费用而定,将委托一代理理论的基本模型与成本加百分比酬金的计价方式相结合,提出了分区间奖励的激励方案。 最后对前文四个方面的激励方案进行总结,提出了激励机制的内容和具体的激励措施。对研究的不足进行总结及对研究的前景进行展望。
[Abstract]:In the field of modern project management, owners and other project participants form a "principal-agent" relationship by signing contracts. However, in this relationship, owners and other participants have different goals and conflicts of interest. Because of the asymmetric information between the two parties, moral hazard will be caused, that is, other participants will do harm to the interests of the owner because of their own interests. Therefore, owners should establish appropriate incentives to motivate other participants to help themselves achieve project objectives. The theories of organization behavior, game theory and information economics, project management theory, principal-agent theory and so on, which are used in the research process, are aimed at the project participants (design unit, contractor, contractor, etc.) Professional consulting units, suppliers, supervision units, etc.) in the quality, progress, safety and cost of four aspects of the performance analysis, select the relevant incentive factors to study. These four aspects are very important objectives in project management, so the research on these four aspects can improve the effectiveness of incentive. In the aspect of quality management, the factors affecting quality and the responsibility of the project participants in the process of quality management are first determined, and the owner motivates the participants according to the performance of the quality management. And through the decision tree to establish the mathematical model and solve the model to study whether the owner should carry out the whole process quality control. In the aspect of schedule control, the aim of the study is to shorten the time limit without increasing manpower and material resources. In the course of the research, the network diagram is introduced, and the lowest cost curve is determined. Through the calculation of the network diagram, the following problems are mainly solved: should the time limit be compressed, The question of which or which processes should be compressed and how to determine the incentive intensity. In the aspect of safety management, the participants should carry out safety education and training, and carry out safety inspection. In the process of project construction and after the completion of the project, the owner shall evaluate the performance of the participants in the safety management and motivate them according to the evaluation results. In the aspect of cost control, the determination of incentive compensation scheme is studied. In the study, based on the principal-agent theory, the income function and constraint conditions of the owner are established, and an external environment variable is introduced, which reduces the possibility of false incentive and improves the effectiveness of incentive. In addition, the benefits of other participants are divided into two parts, the fixed portion and the incentive part, which do not change with the actual cost of the project, while the incentive component is based on the actual cost of the project, The basic model of principal-agent theory is combined with the pricing method of cost plus percentage gratuity, and the incentive scheme of incentive is put forward. Finally, the paper summarizes the four incentive schemes, and puts forward the contents of the incentive mechanism and the specific incentive measures. The deficiency of the research is summarized and the prospect of the research is prospected.
【学位授予单位】:山东建筑大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F284;TU712

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前8条

1 刘浪;李海;;新版FIDIC在项目管理中的应用[J];重庆交通大学学报(自然科学版);2008年01期

2 陈Pr苑;张巍;;建设工程最优激励合同机制的设计[J];重庆大学学报(自然科学版);2006年09期

3 张姝洁,戴毅,戴智,刘尔烈;工程建设中的激励因素分析[J];港工技术;2004年04期

4 程述;谢丽芳;;工程项目风险分担模型探讨[J];工程建设与设计;2006年11期

5 颜瑞禧;建筑工程合同体系发展趋势[J];广东建材;2005年02期

6 吴良;查连山;;建筑工程中施工索赔的管理[J];电大理工;2005年03期

7 张光辉;;从动态博弈建立水利建设项目的管理激励与约束机制[J];黑龙江水利科技;2008年02期

8 王卓甫,杨高升,肖亦林;建设工程合同激励机制的探讨[J];建筑;2005年05期

相关博士学位论文 前1条

1 戴春爱;基于EVM的项目管理激励问题研究[D];电子科技大学;2011年



本文编号:1829190

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jingjiguanlilunwen/1829190.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户cca6f***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com