不对称信息下双渠道供应链的契约研究

发布时间：2018-05-03 14:10

本文选题：不对称信息 + 双渠道　；参考：《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：国际贸易和经济全球化的迅猛发展，改变了传统的贸易方式，，制造商和零售商等合作伙伴之间的贸易范围不再局限于国内，其销售方式也突破了以往的线下销售模式，引进了线上线下的O2O销售模式，即既可以通过传统的零售模式进行销售，也可以通过网络渠道进行销售，这种双渠道供应链模式改变了零售商和制造商的利润分布，也深深的影响着我们的生活。和传统的单渠道供应链相比较，双渠道供应链有着一定的优越性，但是零售渠道和网络渠道之间存在着冲突，且双渠道也拥有着与单渠道供应链一样的弊端，如信息不对称等，这些同样将影响着供应链成员之间的利益，为此如何实现双渠道供应链成员的最优决策和渠道的协调成为了当今企业和学者关注的热点。本文就是在这大时代背景下，研究不对称信息下双渠道供应链的最优决策的问题，并加入契约以协调供应链。首先，文章分析了供应链协调和契约的相关理论，并阐述了双渠道供应链的概念和特点，建立双渠道供应链的模型，分析对称信息下一体化时和分散状态时的双渠道供应链的最优决策，并为下文研究不对称信息下的决策打下基础；接着，在上一章模型的基础上，加入信息不对称的因素，结合主从博弈、委托代理理论和简单的批发价格契约，构建双渠道供应链的模型，并探讨不对称信息下双渠道供应链的最优定价决策，分析了不对称信息对渠道成员利润的影响，结论指出，当零售商为高成本状态时，不对称信息会使得零售价格和批发价格上升，而不改变直销价格，相应的会导致零售需求的下降和直销需求的增加，在此状态下，零售商可以获得保留利润，而制造商利润受损，最终供应链整体利润受损；当零售商为低成本状态时，不对称信息仅仅使得批发价格发生改变，直销价格、零售价格以及零售需求、直销渠道需求都不发生变动，且零售商最终获利，制造商利润受损，渠道总利润不变。因此我们可以发现，不论零售商成本状态如何，实现信息共享总是对制造商有利的，且批发价格契约只能实现零售商低成本状态下供应链的协调。接着，用收益共享契约替代批发价格契约来分析不对称信息下双渠道供应链的最优决策和不对称信息对渠道利润的影响，旨在分析两种契约在不对称信息下协调供应链的优劣性，结论指出不论哪种契约，其对渠道成员决策的影响仅仅只是批发价格的不同，没有影响其他决策，渠道利润也不会因此有所差别，两种契约没有本质上的优劣性之分；最后，文章对对称信息下和不对称信息下结合两种契约的双渠道供应链的决策进行数值分析，证明结论的正确性。本文主要研究不对称下双渠道供应链的最优决策及协调，文章的主要创新点有：（1）在前人学者的基础上，结合主从博弈和委托代理理论，构建不对称信息下的双渠道供应链的模型，探讨渠道成员的最优决策，比较符合现实状况；（2）加入批发价格契约和收益共享契约，探讨成本信息不对称状态下的供应链的协调，具有现实意义；（3）加入不对称信息的因素，在渠道成员决策的基础上分析了不对称信息对渠道利润的影响，指出信息共享对制造商总是有利的。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of international trade and economic globalization has changed the traditional way of trade , and the trade scope between manufacturers and retailers is no longer limited to the domestic market .

Firstly , this paper analyzes the theory of supply chain coordination and contract , and expounds the concept and characteristics of dual - channel supply chain , establishes the model of double - channel supply chain , analyzes the optimal decision - making of the two - channel supply chain in the time of integration and decentralized state under the symmetry information , and lays a foundation for the decision - making under the asymmetric information below ;
Then , on the basis of the previous chapter , the factors of asymmetric information are added , the model of double channel supply chain is constructed by combining the principal and slave game , the principal agent theory and the simple wholesale price contract , and the influence of the asymmetric information on the profit of the channel members is analyzed .
When the retailer is a low - cost state , the asymmetry information only makes wholesale price change , direct selling price , retail price and retail demand , direct marketing channel demand does not change , and retailers eventually profit , manufacturers profit is damaged , channel total profit remains unchanged .
Finally , the paper analyses the decision of dual - channel supply chain with two contracts under the condition of symmetric information and asymmetric information , and proves the correctness of the conclusion .

This paper mainly focuses on the optimal decision - making and coordination of double - channel supply chain under asymmetric information . The main innovations of this paper are : ( 1 ) Based on the former scholar , the author constructs the model of double - channel supply chain under asymmetric information based on the theory of principal - slave game and principal agent , and probes into the optimal decision - making of channel members , and the comparison is in accordance with the reality ;
( 2 ) To join wholesale price contract and income sharing contract , to discuss the coordination of supply chain under the asymmetric state of cost information , and has realistic significance ;
( 3 ) The influence of asymmetric information on channel profit is analyzed on the basis of channel member ' s decision - making , and it is pointed out that information sharing is always advantageous to the manufacturer .

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274

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