发展经济:中央政府、地方官员与企业的博弈

发布时间：2018-11-15 20:53

【摘要】：中国经济发展的奇迹在于理顺了中央政府、地方官员以及企业三者之间的关系。本文在稳定子博弈完美均衡的委托代理框架下,抓住政治集权、经济分权的特征,考察了中央与地方官员之间的博弈行动,将地方官员发展经济的行为模型化。地方经济发展本身面临不确定性,其发展绩效较大程度上取决于地方官员的努力程度,发展收益在政府和企业间的分配取决于地方官员的清廉程度,而地方官员的努力程度和清廉程度均取决于中央提供委托代理合约的具体特征。研究发现,中央能够对地方官员设置合理的政治激励与经济报酬激励,以获得高政治支持,进而促进地方经济发展与经济收益的合理分配,增进经济增长与和谐共融。
[Abstract]:The miracle of China's economic development lies in straightening out the relationship among central government, local officials and enterprises. Based on the principal-agent framework of perfect equilibrium of stable sub-game, this paper grasps the characteristics of political centralization and economic decentralization, investigates the game action between central and local officials, and models the behavior of local officials in economic development. Local economic development itself is faced with uncertainty, its development performance depends largely on the efforts of local officials, and the distribution of development benefits among governments and enterprises depends on the degree of integrity of local officials. The degree of effort and integrity of local officials depends on the specific characteristics of the agency contract provided by the central government. It is found that the central government can set up reasonable political incentives and economic reward incentives for local officials in order to obtain high political support and thus promote the rational distribution of local economic development and economic benefits and promote economic growth and harmonious integration.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;海南大学;暨南大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“中国地方政府产业政策对产业结构及资源配置效率的影响研究”(71303063) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目“中国地方官员调配的运转机制及其经济社会效应研究”(12YJC790192)的资助
【分类号】：D630;F124;F224.32

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