基于演化博弈模型的企业集团母子公司治理研究

发布时间：2019-05-13 19:46

【摘要】：母子公司治理是企业集团治理的核心问题,集团内母子公司相互联系又相对独立的关系产生了新的治理问题,成为影响企业集团发挥整体优势的难题。本文运用演化博弈分析模型,充分考虑治理的动态性及子公司能动性对治理的影响,研究企业集团治理中母公司对子公司监督策略选择与子公司策略选择的互动机制,并对影响该系统演化过程稳定的重要因素进行分析,为解决企业集团母子公司间委托代理问题提供一种新的思路。研究结果表明博弈过程在3种情况下存在演化稳定策略,而不存在最优的稳定策略。通过设计合理的激励机制,如在对子公司的激励中引入提成比与子公司为集团创造收益正相关的业绩提成报酬、增加处罚力度、采取定期或不定期抽查等方式,可影响母子公司策略选择的调整速度,使博弈向(集团利益最大化、不监督)的策略演化,促进母子公司之间建立起一种互信互利的良好关系,增加集团整体收益,发挥企业集团的整体优势。
[Abstract]:Parent-subsidiary governance is the core issue of enterprise group governance. The relationship between parent and subsidiary companies in the group has produced new governance problems, which has become a difficult problem that affects the overall advantages of enterprise groups. In this paper, the evolutionary game analysis model is used to fully consider the dynamic nature of governance and the influence of subsidiary initiative on governance, and to study the interactive mechanism between parent company and subsidiary strategy choice in enterprise group governance. The important factors affecting the stability of the evolution process of the system are analyzed, which provides a new idea for solving the principal-agent problem between parent and subsidiary companies of enterprise groups. The results show that there is an evolutionary stability strategy in three cases, but there is no optimal stability strategy in the game process. Through the design of a reasonable incentive mechanism, such as the introduction of a commission ratio in the incentive of a subsidiary company and the performance commission reward positively related to the subsidiary company's creation of income for the group, increasing the intensity of punishment, adopting regular or irregular spot checks, and so on, It can affect the adjustment speed of the strategy choice of the parent and subsidiary companies, make the game evolve to the strategy of maximizing the interests of the group and not supervising, promote the establishment of a good relationship of mutual trust and mutual benefit between the parent and subsidiary companies, and increase the overall income of the group. Give full play to the overall advantages of enterprise groups.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家创新研究群体科学基金资助项目(71221061) 湖南省社科基金项目(12JDZ35)
【分类号】：F271;F224.32

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