高管集权、内部控制与公司绩效关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 21:18

本文关键词：高管集权、内部控制与公司绩效关系研究　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2004年,为避免类似安然事件的发生,国际上颁布并推行了更加严格的内控法案——《塞班斯法案》,随后,更多的经济学家和研究人员投身到了公司治理这一课题中,希望能够用完善的内控制度,减少因内控缺陷导致的巨大经济损失,继而涌现出了大量有关内部控制的中外文献。然而,十几年间的研究仍主要围绕着公司业绩和内控体系的相关性展开,除此之外,对其他相关研究的关注度则较小,如对于上市公司而言,所有权归属于国家还是非国家是否会影响内控体系的架构?高层管理人员的个人权力大小将对内部控制的有效性产生积极还是消极的影响?高管权力是否受限、内部控制是否有效是否会直接造成上市公司的绩效差异?这些问题都值得关注。在资本市场尚不十分完善的我国,由于经济环境和相关制度尚不成熟健全,政府、相关监管机构和有关部门仍然需要不断的对企业进行宏观调控。由政府任命和指派的国有控股上市公司的高层管理人员,虽然在专业技能和知识水平方面较其他高管可能略逊一筹,但却可以凭借其丰富的人脉和背景资源,带给国有控股企业更大的竞争优势。正是基于此种背景,国有控股企业往往可以凭借其背景和资源在融资渠道、技术获取、市场拓展等等方面获得更多的支持。此外,五千年的历史文化潜移默化的加重了君主集权、阶级至上的腐朽观念,这种观念无形中使得我国上市公司某些高层管理人员的个人权力过度膨胀、“一言堂”这种本不应出现的现象在我国变得普遍且严重。回望近年来我国在上市公司内控披露方面所做的工作,不难发现,内部控制指数都在不断攀升,但仍有很多内控披露方面的问题值得思考,对于上市公司而言,高层管理人员的个人权力大小是否会对公司内部控制产生影响?产生何种影响?继而会对公司绩效产生怎样的传导作用?不同产权性质下,这种影响作用是否相同?本文正是就上述疑问,提取相应的数据,结合相关经验和模型,对上述问题进行系统和客观的分析和检验。本文实证以2012-2015年沪市A股上市公司为初始样本,研究国有和非国有上市公司高管集权、内部控制与公司绩效间的关系。结果表明:良好的内部控制能够有效提升公司绩效;高管组织权、高管所有权的集中与公司绩效没有明显的直接关系;在国有控股公司,高管组织权的过度集中会对公司内部控制产生负面影响,进而降低公司绩效水平;而高管所有权因国有企业高管持股较少,虽然会对公司内部控制产生正面影响,但是效果不显著。在非国有控股公司,高管组织权的过度集中会对公司内部控制产生正面影响,进而提高公司绩效水平;而高管所有权的集中则会抑制内部控制对公司绩效的提升作用。
[Abstract]:In 2004, in order to avoid a similar Enron event on the international promulgation and implementation more stringent internal control act -- the "Sarbanes Oxley Act", then, more and more economists and researchers devoted themselves to the subject of corporate governance, hope to be able to use a perfect internal control system, reduce the huge economic losses caused by internal defects. Then the emergence of a large number of internal control of Chinese and foreign literature. However, the research of ten years is still mainly revolves around the relationship between company performance and the internal control system, in addition to other relevant research attention is small, such as for listed companies, ownership belongs to the country or non state will affect the internal control system architecture? The senior management of the personal power size will produce positive or negative effect on the effectiveness of internal control? The executive power is limited or not, whether internal control Whether effective will be the direct result of the performance of listed companies? These issues are worthy of attention. In China's capital market is not perfect, due to the economic environment and the related system is not mature and perfect, the government and relevant departments, regulators still need to continue to carry out macro-control enterprises. Appointed by the government and the listed assignment the state-owned holding company's senior management, while the professional skills and knowledge level than other executives may be slightly inferior, but can rely on its rich resources of contacts and background, the state-owned holding enterprises bring greater competitive advantage. It is based on such background, state-owned enterprises often can rely on its background and resources in financing channels technology acquisition, market development, etc., to get more support. In addition, five thousand years of history and culture exerts aggravated the monarchy, first class The decadent ideas, the concept of intangible in the listed companies in China has certain executives personal power over expansion, "this should not What I say goes." phenomenon has become widespread and serious in our country. Back in recent years in our country listed companies internal control disclosure of the work done, it is not difficult to find, the internal control index are rising, but there are still a lot of internal control disclosure issues worthy of consideration, for listed companies, whether the senior management of the personal power size will have influence on the internal control of the company? What kind of impact? Then how will produce conduction effect on corporate performance? The different nature of property right, this effect is the same? This paper is on the above questions, extract the corresponding data, combined with relevant experience and model, systematic and objective analysis and test of the above problems. This paper empirically by 2012-2 015 years of Shanghai A shares of listed companies as the initial sample of state-owned and non state-owned listed company executives centralization, internal control and corporate performance. The results show that good internal control can effectively improve the performance of the company executives; the right to organize, there is no significant correlation between executive ownership concentration and corporate performance in state-owned holding; company executives, excessive concentration of the right to organize will have a negative impact on the internal control of the company, thereby reducing the level of corporate performance and ownership of state-owned enterprise executives; for executives holding less, although will have a positive impact on the internal control of the company, but the effect is not significant. In non-state-owned companies, the excessive concentration of executives of the right to organize to produce positive the impact of internal control of the company, and to improve the level of corporate performance and ownership concentration; executives will inhibit the role of internal control to enhance the performance of the company.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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