机构投资者持股、产权性质与公司违规

发布时间：2018-03-03 21:18

本文选题：机构投资者持股　切入点：产权性质　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2015年11月15日发布的《2015中国上市公司法律风险指数报告》指出2014年我国上市公司出现违规的次数同比上年上升了204%,上市公司合规运营压力明显增大。公司违规不仅有损企业自身形象,也扰乱了市场秩序,阻碍了资本市场的健康发展,甚至损害了广大投资者利益,是资本市场重点关注且亟待解决的重要问题,也是市场监管者面临的巨大挑战。因此,本文以此为研究背景,并结合我国上市公司机构投资者发展现状和所有权性质的特殊性,分别研究机构投资者持股、产权性质对公司违规的影响,以及产权性质对机构投资者持股与公司违规相关关系的作用。本文希望通过对机构投资者持股、产权性质与公司违规三者关系的研究,进一步了解我国上市公司股权结构、实际控制人性质与我国资本市场健康状况的相互影响和作用关系。通过查阅和梳理国内外相关文献,本文发现机构投资者持股与公司治理的相关研究起步较早且成果丰富。就机构投资者是否有动机以及能否对公司治理产生积极影响,已有研究得出了两个相对的结论即“积极持股论”与“消极持股论”。随着国内经验数据的积累,“积极持股论”得到了更多的证实和肯定。当持股比例上升时,机构投资者愿意并能够对公司治理施加积极影响,发挥有效的监督作用。机构投资者持股与公司违规的研究主要基于机构投资者持股与公司治理的理论成果。现阶段国内在该领域涉足较少,仍属于前沿的研究内容,具有一定的研究价值。在机构投资者持股与产权性质的研究问题上,已有文献已基于盈余管理视角考察了机构投资者持股与国有控股交互作用下的治理效应,公司违规尚属新的角度和切口。因此,本文以考察国内较少涉足的机构投资者持股对公司违规的影响为出发点,结合我国上市公司实际控制人异质性特征,进一步研究产权性质对公司违规以及机构投资者持股与公司违规相关关系的影响,顺应了时代背景和理论发展需求,具有一定的创新之处和实用价值。本文依据委托代理理论、机构股东积极主义假说、政府干预理论以及相关研究分析,建立了机构投资者持股、产权性质与公司违规三者关系的理论框架,并在此基础之上提出本文的三个假设。然后,基于构建的两个多元线性回归模型,利用我国2011-2015年沪深A股上市公司数据进行实证检验与结果分析。经检验本文所有的假设都显著成立,可以得出:机构投资者持股比例越高,公司违规的可能性越小;相较于国有上市公司,非国有上市公司违规的可能性更大;机构投资者持股比例与公司违规可能性的负相关关系在非国有上市公司是显著的,在国有上市公司是不显著的。由此,本文认为提高机构投资者持股比例有助于抑制公司违规,尤其针对非国有上市公司违规问题的解决能取得更好的效果。本文的创新之处在于拓展了机构投资者持股影响公司违规的研究视角。本文考虑了产权性质因素,基于完整的机构投资者持股、产权性质与公司违规三者关系的理论分析,设计了机构投资者持股比例与产权性质的交互项来重点检验产权性质对机构投资者持股与公司违规相关关系的影响,最后利用最近五年的样本数据进行实证检验,取得的研究结论能进一步丰富机构投资者持股影响公司违规的理论成果。本文的研究结论肯定了机构投资者监督公司违规作用的有效性,具有以下实用价值:为上市公司控制自身违规倾向、强化合规经营理念、实现长远发展目标提供方法论,在引入机构投资者的问题决策上提供经验支持;为鼓励和引导机构投资者发挥监督公司违规作用以及保障机构投资者作用发挥的政策制定提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:The November 15, 2015 release of <2015 China listed company legal risk index report "pointed out that in 2014 the Chinese listed companies illegal times last year rose by 204%, the listed company compliance operation pressure increased significantly. Companies not only detrimental to the image of the enterprise, but also disrupted the market order, hindered the healthy development of the capital market, or even damage the interests of the majority of investors, is an important problem in capital market focus and urgent challenge, is also the market regulators. Therefore, this paper is based on this background, combined with the particularity of the city, the development of institutional investors in our country the status and nature of ownership, of institutional investors, affect the property nature of the company's violations, and the nature of property rights of institutional investors and companies related relationship. This paper hopes to institutional investors holding Study on property rights and corporate shares, in violation of the relationship between the three, to further understand the ownership structure of Listed Companies in China, are affecting the health of the nature of the actual controller and the capital market of our country and interaction. Through reading and summarizing the relevant literature, this paper found that such research started institutional investors and corporate governance earlier and fruitful on whether institutional investors have the motivation and can have a positive impact on corporate governance, the existing research draws two conclusions: "positive relative ownership theory" and "negative equity theory". With the experience in the accumulation of data, "actively holding theory" has been more confirmed and affirmed. When the shareholding ratio rises institutional investors, willing and able to exert positive influence on corporate governance, play an effective supervisory role. The main research base of institutional investors and corporate irregularities Theoretical results on institutional investors and corporate governance. At this stage in the field are less involved in research content, still belongs to the frontier, has certain research value. In the study of institutional investors and property rights, the existing literature has been based on the visual angle of study of earnings management governance effect of interaction between institutional investors and the state holding the companies is a new angle and cut. Therefore, based on the survey of the domestic and the less involved in the impact of institutional investors on the companies as a starting point, combined with China's actual control of listed companies heterogeneity, further research on the impact of the company's property rights violations and violations of institutional investors and corporate relationship the times background and theoretical development, has certain innovation and practical value. This paper based on the principal-agent theory, machine The shareholder activism hypothesis, analysis of government intervention theory and related research, established the theoretical framework of institutional investors, property companies and the relationship between the three and three hypotheses and on the basis of this paper. Then, based on the two multivariate linear regression model, empirical testing and results analysis of the use of me in 2011-2015 years the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed company data. After inspection all of the assumptions are evident, it can be concluded that higher proportion of institutional investors holding companies, the less likely; compared with the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies illegal more likely; a negative correlation between the ratio of institutional investors and companies the possibility is significant in the non state-owned listed companies, in the state-owned listed companies is not significant. Thus, it increased the proportion of institutional investors holding help Suppression of violations, especially to solve for violations of non state-owned listed companies can get better effect. The innovation of this paper is to expand the impact of institutional investors on Perspective of corporate violations. Considering the nature of property rights, complete investment mechanism based on ownership, property rights and the analysis of the relationship between the three companies illegal theory. The design of the impact of institutional ownership and property rights to the focus of the examination interaction property for institutional investors and companies related, finally an empirical test using the data of the recent five years, the conclusions of research can further enrich the institutional investors affect the company's violation of the theoretical results. The conclusions of this study confirmed effective supervision of institutional investors, illegal action, has the practical value for listed companies to control The body of illegal tendency, strengthening the concept of compliance management, to achieve long-term development goal to provide methodological support, in the introduction of institutional investors decision-making; provide a theoretical basis for encouraging and guiding the institutional investors play a supervisory role and guarantee companies institutional investors play a role in policy making.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F271;F832.51

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