证券分析师跟踪与企业双重代理成本——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-28 01:32

本文选题：证券分析师跟踪　切入点：第一类代理成本　出处：《中国软科学》2017年10期

【摘要】：本文以2003-2014年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,就证券分析师跟踪对企业代理成本的影响进行了实证研究。研究表明:(1)证券分析师跟踪是一把"双刃剑",其既会加剧股东与经理层之间的第一类代理成本,同时亦能降低大股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理成本;(2)证券分析师跟踪既能缓解企业融资约束,亦能降低关联并购行为中的第二类代理成本,但其会增加第一类代理成本。公司治理既须重视证券分析师跟踪的积极意义,亦须正视证券分析师跟踪的失效机制,并藉此最大程度地降低企业双重代理成本。本文既提供了诠释企业代理问题的新视角,亦补充了中国情境下证券分析师跟踪之经济后果的经验证据。
[Abstract]:This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies as research samples from 2003 to 2014. This paper makes an empirical study on the influence of the securities analyst tracking on the agency cost of the enterprise. The research shows that the securities analyst tracking is a "double-edged sword", which can aggravate the first kind of agency cost between shareholders and managers. At the same time, it can also reduce the second kind of agency cost between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders. The tracking of securities analysts can not only ease the financing constraints of enterprises, but also reduce the second kind of agency costs in related mergers and acquisitions. But it will increase the first kind of agency cost. Corporate governance should not only pay attention to the positive significance of securities analyst tracking, but also face up to the failure mechanism of securities analyst tracking. This paper not only provides a new perspective to explain the agency problem, but also complements the empirical evidence of the economic consequences of the tracking of securities analysts in the context of China.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;浙江大学宁波理工学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“基于双重委托代理理论模型构建的股权集中型公司治理最优化研究”(70502024) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-11-0412)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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