业绩补偿承诺对标的企业的激励效应研究——来自中小板和创业板上市公司的实证检验

发布时间：2018-04-03 02:17

本文选题：业绩补偿承诺　切入点：激励效应　出处：《会计研究》2017年03期

【摘要】：业绩补偿承诺协议是并购交易定价事后调整的一种契约安排。本文的实证研究发现,业绩补偿承诺对并购后标的企业业绩的提升具有激励效应,但相比于单向业绩承诺,双向业绩承诺并没有发挥更显著的激励作用。激励效应与承诺的业绩增长率呈倒U型的相关关系,随着承诺业绩增长率的提高,激励效应呈现先上升后下降的态势。研究还发现,当实际业绩无法达到承诺值时,约定的惩罚方式会影响标的企业的业绩,且相对于现金赔偿方式,股权赔偿方式的激励效应更明显。业绩补偿承诺协议对于提升标的企业并购绩效具有激励作用,本文的研究指出了业绩补偿承诺协议在实际应用中的价值和可能存在的不足,对于优化并购定价机制具有一定的借鉴作用。
[Abstract]:Performance compensation commitment agreement is a kind of contract arrangement in which M & A transaction pricing is adjusted afterwards.The empirical study of this paper finds that performance compensation commitment has incentive effect on the performance improvement of target enterprises after M & A, but compared with one-way performance commitment, two-way performance commitment does not play a more significant incentive role.The incentive effect is inversely U-shaped with the performance growth rate of commitment. With the increase of the performance growth rate of commitment, the incentive effect increases first and then decreases.It is also found that when the actual performance can not reach the commitment value, the agreed punishment will affect the performance of the underlying firm, and the incentive effect of the equity compensation is more obvious than the cash compensation.The performance compensation commitment agreement has the incentive function to enhance the performance of the target enterprise merger and acquisition. The research in this paper points out the value of the performance compensation commitment agreement in the practical application and the possible shortcomings.It can be used for reference to optimize the pricing mechanism of M & A.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大招标项目(14ZDA051)、国家社科基金重点项目(14AGL012) 泰山学者工程专项资助
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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