高管团队特征对高管激励强度影响企业价值的调节效应研究
本文选题:股权激励强度 + 货币薪酬激励强度 ; 参考:《东北农业大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:管理之道,惟在用人,企业之间的竞争转变为人才的竞争。理性的高级管理人员以自身利益最大化为目标,在经营管理过程中极有可能发生机会主义行为,降低投资效率和损害企业利益。因此,制定良好的激励机制成为公司治理首要解决的问题,也是提升企业价值的重要举措。然而,以往的研究大多将激励机制作为一个整体研究,研究激励方案契约要素激励效果的文章相对较少,结论也不尽相同。激励强度作为激励方案最重要的契约要素,其对企业价值是否产生影响,以及如何提高影响程度以提升企业价值更加值得我们进行深入探讨。许多学者认为在激励机制影响企业价值的过程中会受到不同因素的作用导致研究结果出现偏差。基于此思路,我们发现激励方案实施缺乏层次性,较少考虑高管特征权变因素,忽略由于不同的高管特征对激励方案的偏好不同,导致激励方案价值效应不同。因此,在现有的高管激励机制下,何种激励方案强度要素能够有效激励高管,以及何种特征的高管团队能够进一步增强激励强度对企业价值的影响以此提高企业价值成为本文研究的重点。文章在激励理论、高层梯队理论与企业价值等相关理论的基础上进行深入研究,首先机理分析高管激励强度对企业价值直接影响以及考虑不同高管团队特征权变因素后,激励强度对企业价值影响的变化并提出相应研究假设;其次,选取2006-2015年深、上证交所主板公告的实施股权激励方案的上市企业作为研究样本,采用多元回归分析的方法检验高管激励强度(股权激励强度和货币薪酬激励强度)对企业价值直接影响,运用层次回归分析的方法,研究高管团队特征对高管激励强度影响企业价值的调节效应,即在考虑高管团队年龄、教育背景、任期特征权变因素后,高管激励强度对企业价值影响系数与直接影响系数进行对比,二者显著的差异表明高管团队特征具有显著的调节作用,通过高管团队特征与高管激励强度交互项系数进一步分析不同高管团队特征的调节效应;最后根据研究成果得出提升企业价值的措施。研究表明:股权激励强度显著负向影响企业价值,薪酬激励强度显著正向影响企业价值;高管团队特征表现出不同的调节作用,高管团队特征对限制性股票激励强度影响价值的调节效应强于股票期权激励强度影响企业价值的调节效应;高管团队年龄、高管团队教育背景和高管团队任期均减弱股权激励强度对企业价值的负向影响;高管团队年龄弱化货币薪酬激励强度对企业价值的正向影响,高管团队教育水平和高管团队任期均对货币薪酬激励强度影响企业价值起到强化的调节效应。研究认为:企业应该通过发挥股权激励强度价值效应和货币薪酬激励强度价值效应来提升企业价值,主要措施为重视股权激励方案强度要素价值效应、充分利用高管团队特征在股权激励机制中调节效应、广泛运用标的物为限制性股票的激励方式、突出货币薪酬强度要素的激励作用、实施激励的同时完善企业监督机制、充分利用高管团队特征在货币薪酬激励机制中调节效应。
[Abstract]:The way of management is to change the competition between people and enterprises into the competition of talents. The rational senior managers aim at the maximization of their own interests. In the process of management, it is very likely that opportunism will occur, reduce the efficiency of investment and damage the interests of the enterprises. Therefore, a good incentive mechanism has become the primary solution to the corporate governance. The problem is also an important measure to improve the value of the enterprise. However, most of the previous studies take incentive mechanism as a whole research. The research on incentive effect of incentive scheme contract factors is relatively small and the conclusion is different. Incentive intensity is the most important contract factor of incentive scheme, and it has an impact on the enterprise value. And how to improve the degree of impact to improve the value of the enterprise is worth further discussion. Many scholars believe that the effect of different factors on the impact of incentive mechanism on the enterprise value will lead to the deviation of the results. Based on this idea, we find that the incentive scheme is lack of hierarchy and less consideration of executive characteristic rights. Changing factors, ignoring the different preference of different executive characteristics to incentive schemes, leads to the different value effects of incentive schemes. Therefore, under the existing executive incentive mechanism, what incentive scheme intensity factors can effectively motivate executives and what characteristics of the executive team can further enhance the impact of incentive intensity on enterprise value. On the basis of the theory of incentive, the theory of top echelon and the value of enterprise, this paper makes an in-depth study. Firstly, it analyzes the direct impact of executive incentive intensity on the enterprise value and considering the factors of different executive team characteristics, and the intensity of incentive is reflected to the value of the enterprise. Secondly, select the listed enterprises of the equity incentive plan of Shanghai Shanghai stock exchange for 2006-2015 years as the research sample, and use multiple regression analysis to test the direct impact of executive incentive intensity (equity incentive intensity and monetary salary incentive intensity) on the enterprise value, and use the level. The method of regression analysis is used to study the regulation effect of executive team characteristics on executive incentive intensity affecting enterprise value. That is, after considering the senior management team age, educational background, and tenure characteristics, the executive incentive intensity is compared with the direct impact coefficient of the enterprise value impact coefficient. The significant difference between the two shows the characteristics of the executive team. With the significant adjustment function, the adjustment effect of the characteristics of different executive team is further analyzed through the interaction coefficient of senior executive team and executive incentive intensity. Finally, the measures to improve the enterprise value are obtained according to the research results. The research shows that the equity incentive intensity significantly negatively affects the enterprise value, and the salary incentive intensity has a significant positive effect. Corporate value, executive team characteristics show different regulatory roles. The regulation effect of executive team characteristics on the impact value of limited stock incentive intensity is stronger than the effect of stock option incentive intensity on the adjustment effect of enterprise value; senior executive team age, executive team education background and executive team term weaken equity incentive intensity to enterprises The negative influence of the business value; the age of the executive team weakens the positive influence of the monetary salary incentive intensity on the enterprise value, the level of executive team education and the tenure of the executive team all have a strengthening effect on the influence of the monetary incentive intensity on the value of the enterprise. The main measures are to pay attention to the value effect of the strength factor of the equity incentive scheme, make full use of the regulation effect of the executive team characteristics in the equity incentive mechanism, and widely use the subject matter as the incentive mode of the restricted stock, highlight the incentive effect of the monetary remuneration intensity factors and implement the incentive. At the same time, we should improve the supervision mechanism and make full use of the moderating effect of the TMT characteristics in the monetary compensation incentive mechanism.
【学位授予单位】:东北农业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F832.51
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