基于网络位置的独立董事治理与非效率投资关系研究

发布时间：2018-07-18 13:40

【摘要】：投资为经济的高速发展提供了巨大的动力,其效率的高低也成为国民经济快速增长的重要制约因素。然而,由于委托代理问题和市场信息不对称的存在,上市公司中存在着大量的投资意愿偏误和操作失误,资源分配无法达到帕累托最优状态,导致了上市公司非效率投资的发生。为了减少非效率投资行为的发生,我国不断加强公司治理的力度,并在2001年将独立董事制度引入公司治理体系。独立董事治理主要通过监督机制和政策建议机制对公司管理层的投资行为加以影响,降低因委托代理增加的成本,减少因信息不对称导致的逆向选择的发生,不断提高公司的投资效率。但是,学者的研究结论大相径庭,部分学者甚至认为上市公司中存在着部分“花瓶董事”。对此,本文首先从理论层面分析了独立董事治理对非效率投资的抑制作用以及独立董事的网络位置对于这一抑制作用的调节作用;其次,本文对2006-2015年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据进行了实证分析,对上述理论分析的结论进行了验证。研究表明,独立董事治理可以有效地抑制公司的投资不足,而且独立董事越处于网络中心位置,该抑制作用越强;独立董事对于公司的过度投资影响并不明显,而且独立董事网络位置的调节作用也不明显。最后,本文从信息保障机制、权责制度和激励机制等方面提出了对策建议,期望可以进一步降低公司的非效率投资行为。
[Abstract]:Investment provides a huge impetus for the rapid development of economy, and its efficiency also becomes an important factor restricting the rapid growth of national economy. However, due to the existence of principal-agent problem and market information asymmetry, there are a large number of errors in investment intention and operational errors in listed companies, and the allocation of resources cannot reach Pareto optimal state. This leads to the occurrence of inefficient investment of listed companies. In order to reduce the occurrence of the inefficient investment behavior, our country strengthens the corporate governance continuously, and introduces the independent director system into the corporate governance system in 2001. The independent director's governance mainly influences the investment behavior of the management through the supervision mechanism and the policy recommendation mechanism, reduces the increased cost due to the principal-agent, and reduces the adverse selection caused by the asymmetric information. Continuously improve the investment efficiency of the company. However, the research conclusions of scholars are quite different, some scholars even think that there are some "vase directors" in listed companies. In view of this, this paper firstly analyzes the inhibition effect of independent director governance on non-efficiency investment and the moderating effect of independent director's network position on this inhibition. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2015, and verifies the conclusions of the above theoretical analysis. The research shows that the independent director governance can effectively restrain the underinvestment of the company, and the more the independent director is in the center of the network, the stronger the restraining effect is, and the influence of independent director on the overinvestment of the company is not obvious. And the independent director network position adjustment function is not obvious. Finally, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions from the aspects of information guarantee mechanism, power and responsibility system and incentive mechanism, hoping to further reduce the inefficient investment behavior of the company.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51;F275

【参考文献】