机构投资者性质、会计稳健性与公司价值

发布时间：2018-04-11 14:15

本文选题：机构投资者 + 会计稳健性　；参考：《新疆财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：自从有了现代公司，所有权和经营权分离的趋势日渐凸显，并且由此引发了公司治理中的委托—代理问题。要克服这些广泛存在于现代公司中的的委托—代理问题，最终最小化代理成本，更加完善公司治理结构，那就需要有一系列的制度设计。国家针对国有企业提出建立“现代企业制度”以后，其委托代理问题引起了学者的广泛关注，同样要解决国有企业的委托代理问题，也必须采取相互制衡的制度。自20世纪80年代以来，在英美等发达国家，伴随着资本市场在全世界范围的快速扩张，机构投资者成为参与公司治理的一支重要队伍，他们的迅速崛起对于解决普遍存在于公司治理中的的委托—代理关系问题是一种创新的思维和方式。在学术界，，机构投资者在投资战略上的的变化，从而对公司治理造成的影响，目前仍旧处在状争论状态。比如有的学者研究得出机构股东拥有上市公司的股量越大，他们从上市公司市值的提高中就会取得越高的收益，从而机构股东监督管理层的动机就会随之增强，积极性也会大幅提升，那么管理层就会收到约束，最终通过监督方式促使管理者提高公司的绩效水平。但是也有研究人员认为机构股东的积极主义不会对上市公司的绩效水平产生显著的正向作用。尽管理论界对于机构投资者的相关研究得出了不同的研究结论，但是机构投资者投资策略已经转变是一个不争的事实。那么机构投资者积极参与公司治理的效果如何?这一系列问题随着机构股东积极主义的兴起，以及其在世界范围内扩散，显得愈发重要。本文从会计稳健性的角度研究机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。首先对我国机构投资者进行分类，研究监督型机构投资者持股对会计稳健性的作用，然后对样本进行分组，研究在成长机会较高的样本中，这两者的正相关关系是否更强；最后，通过建立模型，来研究监督型机构投资者的入主公司里是否通过稳健性提高了公司价值。具体研究结论是：第一，监督型机构投资者持股比例与会计稳健性正相关，说明我们对机构投资者类型的划分是必要的，监督型的机构投资者确实发挥了治理作用，他们把会计稳健性作为一种治理机制；第二，通过对样本进行分组，发现与成长机会较低的公司样本相比，监督型机构投资者与会计稳健性的正相关关系更强，这说明对成长机会多公司，直接进行监督是没有效果的，因此，监督作用的机构投资者更可能会依赖于像稳健性这样的治理机制；第三，在有监督型机构投资者持股的公司里，公司价值与会计稳健性呈显著的正相关关系，说明机构投资者能够通过改进目标企业公司治理状况来提高公司价值。
[Abstract]:Since the modern company, the trend of separation of ownership and management has become more and more prominent, which has led to the principal-agent problem in corporate governance.In order to overcome these principal-agent problems, minimize agency cost and perfect corporate governance structure, we need a series of system design.Since the establishment of the "modern enterprise system" for the state-owned enterprises, the principal-agent problem has aroused the widespread concern of the scholars. In order to solve the principal-agent problem of the state-owned enterprises, it is also necessary to adopt the system of checks and balances.Since the 1980s, with the rapid expansion of capital markets around the world in developed countries such as the United States and the United States, institutional investors have become an important team to participate in corporate governance.Their rapid rise is an innovative way to solve the problem of principal-agent relationship which exists in corporate governance.In academia, the change of investment strategy of institutional investors, thus the impact on corporate governance, is still in a state of debate.For example, some scholars have found that the larger the number of shares owned by institutional shareholders in listed companies, the higher the return they will get from the improvement of market value, thus the motivation of institutional shareholders to supervise the management will increase.Motivation will also be greatly increased, and management will be constrained and ultimately supervised to improve the performance of the company.However, some researchers believe that institutional shareholder activism does not have a significant positive effect on the performance level of listed companies.Although the theorists have drawn different conclusions about institutional investors, it is an indisputable fact that the investment strategies of institutional investors have changed.What are the effects of institutional investors' active participation in corporate governance?With the rise of institutional shareholder activism and its spread all over the world, these problems become more and more important.This paper studies the role of institutional investors in corporate governance from the perspective of accounting conservatism.Firstly, it classifies the institutional investors in our country, studies the effect of the supervised institutional investors' shareholding on accounting conservatism, and then groups the samples to study whether the positive correlation between the two is stronger in the samples with higher growth opportunities.Finally, the model is established to study whether the corporate value is improved by robustness in the supervised institutional investors.The specific conclusions are as follows: first, the proportion of institutional investors holding shares is positively related to accounting conservatism, which indicates that it is necessary for us to divide the types of institutional investors, and the supervised institutional investors do play a governance role.They regard accounting conservatism as a kind of governance mechanism. Secondly, by grouping the samples, they find that the positive correlation between supervisory institutional investors and accounting conservatism is stronger than the sample of companies with lower growth opportunities.This shows that direct supervision of companies with multiple growth opportunities is ineffective. Therefore, institutional investors who have a supervisory role are more likely to rely on governance mechanisms such as robustness. Third, in companies with supervisory institutional investors,There is a significant positive correlation between corporate value and accounting conservatism, which indicates that institutional investors can improve corporate value by improving corporate governance of target enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F275

【参考文献】