我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空研究

发布时间：2018-09-05 21:02

【摘要】：在我国上市公司中,制造业上市公司占有十分重要的地位。制造业上市公司的发展对我国整体经济的发展具有关键性的作用。然而，制造业上市公司中大股东掏空行为不仅影响着公司自身的发展，同时对整个行业乃至整个国家的发展都有消极的影响。我国的上市公司中普遍存在着一股独大的现象，制造业上市公司大股东掏空现象较其他类型的公司相比较为严重。研究我国制造业上市公司掏空，发掘掏空行为的表现形式以及探讨其影响因素，对于完善中小投资者的利益保护机制有很重要的指导意义。便于我国制造业上市公司有关决策层，制定相应的决策以更好的生产经营，实现公司价值最大化的目标，也有利于促进我国制造业行业和整个国民经济的发展。从理论上，研究我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空进一步丰富了上市公司代理理论，对相关理论研究具有补充和细化作用。本文首先对中外学者的研究进行详细阐述，对大股东掏空的研究成果进行总结，其次从理论的角度叙述有关大股东掏空行为的相关理论，并且具体分析我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为的表现形式以及大股东掏空对公司的影响，为进一步研究制造业上市公司大股东掏空打下基础。再次，本文利用理论和实际相结合的方式，分析我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为的影响因素，并提出相应的假设。第四，选取沪深上市的制造业公司的数据,进行统计性描述和回归分析，探寻影响制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为的因素。最后根据实证分析得出的结论，经分析提出针对性的对策建议。本文主要研究结论如下：一股独大现象加强了制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为动机；独立董事数量与大股东掏空行为成反比例关系；控制人性质对大股东的影响不是很显著；两职设置情况对我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为有一定的影响；我国监事会还没有发挥应有的监督权力；外部审计意见对我国制造业上市公司大股东掏空行为有一定的抑制作用。本文的主要创新之处有以下几点：第一，，应用上的创新。本文采用的数据是最近五年的数据，能够反映近几年制造业上市公司的情况应用上有创新。第二，研究角度和思路的创新。在作出假设时，通过总结以前学者的研究结果和相关理论分析，结合上市公司的实际情况作出假设，并且较全面将内部治理因素和外部审计因素引入模型。第三，提出的对策全面有新意。根据实证部分得出的结论，从内部治理结构和外部环境两个方面提出相应的对策，并且结合我国国内的具体情况和制造业上市公司的实际情况提出建议。
[Abstract]:In our country listed companies, manufacturing listed companies play a very important role. The development of listed manufacturing companies plays a key role in the overall economic development of our country. However, the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in listed manufacturing companies not only affects the development of the company itself, but also has a negative impact on the development of the whole industry and even the whole country. There is a dominant phenomenon in Chinese listed companies, and the phenomenon of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies is more serious than that of other types of companies. It is of great significance to study the tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in our country, to explore the manifestation of tunneling behavior and to explore its influencing factors, which is of great significance to improve the mechanism of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors. It is convenient for the relevant decision makers of the listed manufacturing companies in our country to make corresponding decisions in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of the company and to promote the development of the manufacturing industry and the whole national economy of our country. Theoretically, the research on the large shareholder tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in China further enriches the agency theory of listed companies, which is complementary and detailed to the relevant theoretical research. Firstly, this paper expatiates the research of Chinese and foreign scholars in detail, summarizes the research results of large shareholder tunneling, and then from the theoretical point of view, describes the relevant theories about the behavior of large shareholders tunneling. The paper also analyzes the manifestation of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies and the influence of large shareholder tunneling on the company, which lays a foundation for further study of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies. Thirdly, by combining theory with practice, this paper analyzes the factors influencing the tunneling behavior of large shareholders of listed manufacturing companies in China, and puts forward the corresponding assumptions. Fourthly, the data of manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen are selected, and the statistical description and regression analysis are carried out to find out the factors that affect the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed manufacturing companies. Finally, according to the conclusion of empirical analysis, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: a dominant phenomenon strengthens the motivation of large shareholders' tunneling behavior in manufacturing listed companies; the number of independent directors is inversely proportional to the tunneling behavior of large shareholders; the influence of the nature of controller on large shareholders is not very significant; The establishment of the two positions has a certain influence on the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of the manufacturing listed companies in our country, and the supervisory board of our country has not yet brought into play its proper supervisory power. The external audit opinion can restrain the large shareholders'tunneling behavior of the manufacturing listed companies in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: first, the innovation in application. The data used in this paper are the data of the last five years, which can reflect the innovation in the application of manufacturing listed companies in recent years. Second, research angle and train of thought innovation. In the process of making assumptions, by summarizing the previous research results and relevant theoretical analysis, combining with the actual situation of listed companies, we make assumptions, and introduce the internal governance factors and external audit factors into the model. Third, the proposed countermeasures are full of new ideas. According to the conclusions of the empirical part, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures from two aspects of internal governance structure and external environment, and puts forward some suggestions based on the specific situation of our country and the actual situation of listed manufacturing companies.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F425;F406.7

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