管理层权力、审计师选择与信息披露质量

发布时间：2018-09-09 17:28

【摘要】：信息指引着社会资金流向各实体部门，信息披露是证券市场的基石，信息披露质量决定着信息使用者能否做出有效决策。现有研究表明公司治理结构的完善程度将决定着管理层权力的强弱，外部审计师可以提高上市公司的信息披露质量，那么管理层权力是否会影响审计师的监督治理作用呢？这是一个值得深究的话题。本文引入管理层权力这一概念，按照“上市公司公司治理不完善——管理层权力的形成——管理层的机会主义行为——外部审计师监督、制约——信息披露质量形成”这条主线，将管理层权力、审计师选择结合起来，并着重剖析他们对上市公司信息披露质量的共同影响。本文首先回顾了国内外管理层权力对信息披露质量影响的文献，审计师选择对信息披露质量影响的文献以及管理层权力对审计师选择的文献，然后以委托代理等理论作为理论基础，提出了五个研究假设，构建了两个研究模型，，以2006-2011年间沪深两市7293家上市公司为样本，实证检验了管理层权力对信息披露质量的影响、审计师对信息披露质量的影响以及二者对信息披露质量的共同影响。实证分析共分为三部分，第一部分是管理层权力、审计师以及信息披露质量的描述性统计，第二部分是管理层权力、审计师选择与信息披露质量的相关性分析和回归分析，第三部分运用Heckman两阶段回归的方法对审计师选择与信息披露质量内生性问题进行了稳健性检验。实证研究结果显示：（1）管理层权力会降低信息披露质量；（2）非国有上市公司管理层权力的增强更容易降低信息披露质量；（3）竞争性行业上市公司管理层权力的增强更容易降低信息披露质量；（4）选择高质量的审计师能够提高上市公司的信息披露质量；（5）管理层权力的增强能够弱化高质量审计师对信息披露质量的提升作用。本文的研究结论对于提高信息披露质量有一定的指导意义。在未来，上市公司应健全公司治理机制，区分公司性质和行业特征，进一步规范管理层权力，同时鼓励国内会计师事务所合并，扩大规模，提高审计质量，增强其外部治理作用。
[Abstract]:Information guides the social capital flow to various entities, information disclosure is the cornerstone of the securities market, the quality of information disclosure determines whether information users can make effective decisions. Existing studies show that the degree of perfection of corporate governance structure will determine the strength of management power, external auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, so whether the power of management will affect the governance role of auditors? This is a topic worthy of further study. This paper introduces the concept of management power. According to the concept of "imperfect governance of listed companies-formation of management power-opportunistic behavior of management-supervision by external auditors", The main line of restricting the formation of information disclosure quality combines the power of management and the choice of auditors, and analyzes their common influence on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This paper first reviews the literature on the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure at home and abroad, the influence of auditor selection on the quality of information disclosure, and the literature on the choice of management power to auditor. Then, based on the principal-agent theory, five research hypotheses are put forward, and two research models are constructed. Taking 7293 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2011 as samples, the paper empirically tests the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure. Auditor's influence on the quality of information disclosure and their mutual influence on the quality of information disclosure. The empirical analysis is divided into three parts: the first part is the descriptive statistics of the management power, auditor and the quality of information disclosure, the second part is the management power, the correlation analysis and regression analysis between auditor selection and the quality of information disclosure. The third part uses the Heckman two-stage regression method to test the internal problem of auditor selection and information disclosure quality. The empirical results show that: (1) the power of management will reduce the quality of information disclosure, (2) the enhancement of management power of non-state-owned listed companies is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure; (3) it is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure by strengthening the management power of listed companies in competitive industries, (4) to select high quality auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies; (5) the enhancement of management power can weaken the effect of high-quality auditors on the quality of information disclosure. The conclusion of this paper has certain guiding significance for improving the quality of information disclosure. In the future, listed companies should improve the corporate governance mechanism, regional branch nature and industry characteristics, further standardize the power of management, at the same time encourage domestic accounting firms to merge, expand the scale, and improve audit quality. Enhance its external governance role.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.6;F233

【参考文献】