政府控制、制度环境与评估师选择
发布时间：2018-09-11 08:37
【摘要】：资产评估在国有资产管理、企业并购重组的业务中发挥着重要的作用。随着我国国有企业深化改革、多层次资本市场建立、金融体制改革等一系列国家重大改革的出台，资产评估日益迸发出强大的生命力。但我国资产评估也存在着一些问题：由于我国资产评估行业独特的诞生背景，资产评估行业与政府有着与生俱来的天然关联。这也导致了目前我国评估市场是一个政府控制下的非充分竞争市场。值得关注的是，通过进一步的研究我们发现，评估师的选择是受到政府控制和制度环境两个因素影响的。 在我国评估行业的特殊制度背景下，本文基于政府控制和制度环境两个视角来探讨其对评估师选择的作用机制，主要研究了以下三个问题：（1）政府控制的评估市场对上市公司评估师选择上产生什么影响?国有产权性质的上市公司是否也更倾向于选择具有政治背景的评估机构？（2）具有不同国有产权等级的企业，评估师选择是否存在差异？（3）在其他因素不变的条件下，制度环境如何影响不同产权等级控制下国有企业的评估师选择？ 在研究方法上，本文首先对以往研究文献的梳理、归纳和总结，，找到本文的研究意义。然后从理论上分析政府控制对评估师选择的作用机制。本文运用probit模型，通过多元回归来考察政府控制对评估师选择的影响，从实证的角度分析了政府控制视角下国有企业评估师选择的状况。研究发现中央政府控制的公司更倾向于选择中央政府背景的评估机构，地方政府控制的公司更倾向于选择地方政府背景的评估机构。同时，引入制度环境后的进一步研究表明，制度环境越好(市场化水平越高、政府干预指数越低和法治化水平越高)，企业越可能选择无政治背景的评估机构。即良好的地区制度环境与公司选择具有政治背景的评估机构显著负相关。结合国有产权性质发现，国有产权会削弱制度环境的这种负相关关系。同时，通过分样本检验发现，制度环境对国有企业评估师选择的影响，受国有股权终极控制人等级性质影响。相比中央政府控制的公司，地方政府控制的公司更容易受到制度环境的影响。
[Abstract]:Asset evaluation plays an important role in state-owned assets management and M & A business. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of multi-level capital market, the reform of financial system and a series of important national reforms, asset evaluation has increasingly burst out a strong vitality. However, there are also some problems in asset evaluation in China: because of the unique background of asset appraisal industry, asset appraisal industry has a natural relationship with the government. This also led to the current evaluation market is a government-controlled market under the insufficient competition. It is worth noting that through further research we find that the selection of appraisers is influenced by two factors: government control and institutional environment. Under the background of the special system of evaluation industry in China, this paper discusses the mechanism of the selection of appraisers from the perspectives of government control and institutional environment. This paper mainly studies the following three questions: (1) what impact does the government-controlled evaluation market have on the selection of listed company appraisers? Are listed companies with state-owned property rights more inclined to choose evaluation institutions with political background? (2) with different levels of state-owned property rights, are there any differences between appraisers? (3) under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, How does the institutional environment affect the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises under the control of different levels of property rights? In terms of research methods, this paper firstly combs, summarizes and summarizes the previous research documents, and finds the significance of this study. Then it theoretically analyzes the mechanism of government control on the selection of appraisers. This paper uses probit model to investigate the influence of government control on the selection of appraisers through multiple regression, and analyzes the state of selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government control. It is found that the companies controlled by the central government are more likely to choose the evaluation agencies with the background of the central government, and the firms controlled by the local governments are more inclined to choose the evaluation agencies of the background of the local government. At the same time, the further research after the introduction of institutional environment shows that the better the institutional environment (the higher the marketization level, the lower the government intervention index and the higher the rule of law level), the more likely enterprises are to choose evaluation institutions without political background. That is, good regional institutional environment is negatively correlated with corporate selection with political background. Combining with the nature of state-owned property right, it is found that state-owned property right weakens the negative correlation of institutional environment. At the same time, it is found that the influence of institutional environment on the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises is influenced by the nature of the ultimate controller of state-owned equity. Companies controlled by local governments are more vulnerable to the institutional environment than firms controlled by central government.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F233
本文编号：2236178
[Abstract]:Asset evaluation plays an important role in state-owned assets management and M & A business. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of multi-level capital market, the reform of financial system and a series of important national reforms, asset evaluation has increasingly burst out a strong vitality. However, there are also some problems in asset evaluation in China: because of the unique background of asset appraisal industry, asset appraisal industry has a natural relationship with the government. This also led to the current evaluation market is a government-controlled market under the insufficient competition. It is worth noting that through further research we find that the selection of appraisers is influenced by two factors: government control and institutional environment. Under the background of the special system of evaluation industry in China, this paper discusses the mechanism of the selection of appraisers from the perspectives of government control and institutional environment. This paper mainly studies the following three questions: (1) what impact does the government-controlled evaluation market have on the selection of listed company appraisers? Are listed companies with state-owned property rights more inclined to choose evaluation institutions with political background? (2) with different levels of state-owned property rights, are there any differences between appraisers? (3) under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, How does the institutional environment affect the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises under the control of different levels of property rights? In terms of research methods, this paper firstly combs, summarizes and summarizes the previous research documents, and finds the significance of this study. Then it theoretically analyzes the mechanism of government control on the selection of appraisers. This paper uses probit model to investigate the influence of government control on the selection of appraisers through multiple regression, and analyzes the state of selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government control. It is found that the companies controlled by the central government are more likely to choose the evaluation agencies with the background of the central government, and the firms controlled by the local governments are more inclined to choose the evaluation agencies of the background of the local government. At the same time, the further research after the introduction of institutional environment shows that the better the institutional environment (the higher the marketization level, the lower the government intervention index and the higher the rule of law level), the more likely enterprises are to choose evaluation institutions without political background. That is, good regional institutional environment is negatively correlated with corporate selection with political background. Combining with the nature of state-owned property right, it is found that state-owned property right weakens the negative correlation of institutional environment. At the same time, it is found that the influence of institutional environment on the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises is influenced by the nature of the ultimate controller of state-owned equity. Companies controlled by local governments are more vulnerable to the institutional environment than firms controlled by central government.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F233
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