康得新公司股权激励有效性及影响因素研究

发布时间：2018-01-08 11:27

本文关键词：康得新公司股权激励有效性及影响因素研究　出处：《浙江工商大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代企业所有权和经营权的相分离引发了管理者和所有者在公司经营决策时产生代理矛盾。股权激励在西方被认为能够削弱代理成本,使得管理者和所有者目标趋于一致。在借鉴国外经验后,我国很多公司也采用授予公司雇员特别是管理人员股票期权的方式来对其进行激励。然而不少国内的经验研究表明,我国不少上市公司的股权激励并没有达到预期的效果,其原因在于股权激励方案被设计成变相的利益输送,或成为大股东与管理层合谋“掏空”上市公司的工具。因此,股权激励对上市公司的业绩影响迄今存在三种不同的假说：激励假说、管理层福利假说和“掏空”假说。上市公司股权激励方案效果如何,究竟是符合激励假说,还是管理层福利或者“掏空”假说；上市公司在何种治理环境下股权激励方案才能取得良好的激励效果?这些问题的研究对于评判上市公司股权激励方案的有效性,对于上市公司利益相关者的决策均具有重要意义。康得新公司是2010年上市的高科技民营上市公司,自2011起连续推出三期面向企业高管和技术人员的股权激励方案,引起市场广泛关注。本文以康得新公司股票期权激励方案为研究对象,对公司股权激励方案的实施效果进行评估,并从大股东、董事会和审计机构三个方面研究影响公司股权激励方案有效性的因素。本文通过案例研究得出以下结论：康得新公司股权激励方案从总体上符合激励假说,对康得新公司的高管和核心技术人员实施了有效的激励,企业财务业绩显著提升,股权激励方案得到了机构投资者的广泛认同,市场反应良好。本文认为,康得新公司具有技术研发背景、拥有股权分享理念并能对上市公司实施稳定控制的大股东对股权激励方案的有效性具有决定性作用；康得新公司董事会的规模、知识结构和能力结构以及审计机构的声誉也对康得新公司股权激励方案有效性产生了重要影响。本文对于民营上市公司设计有效的股权激励方案,营造良好的股权激励环境具有重要的借鉴价值；对于上市公司的利益相关者评判股权激励方案的有效性也能够提供有意义的参考。
[Abstract]:The separation of lead managers and owners have problems of agency in the management decision of company ownership and management of modern enterprises. The equity incentive in the west is that can reduce agency cost, so the administrator and the owner are consistent. In reference to foreign experience, many companies in China are used to grant employees especially the management of stock option the way to incentive them. However, many domestic empirical research shows that equity incentive in China's many listed companies did not achieve the desired effect, the reason is that the equity incentive program is designed as a disguised transfer of benefits, or become a major shareholder and management collusion tunneling tool. Therefore, equity incentive effect on the performance of listed companies have three different hypotheses: incentive hypothesis, welfare management hypothesis and the "tunneling" hypothesis listed. The effect of equity incentive plan, what is in line with the incentive hypothesis, or the management of welfare or "tunneling" hypothesis; listed company governance environment in which the equity incentive plan in order to achieve a good incentive effect on the effectiveness of these problems? The incentive scheme for evaluation of shares of listed companies, listed companies for stakeholders in decision-making it is of great significance.
Kangdexin is 2010 listed high-tech private listed company, since 2011 consecutive three to launch equity for business executives and technical staff incentive scheme, caused widespread concern in the market. This paper kangdexin stock option incentive scheme as the research object, to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the company's equity incentive plan, and from large shareholders the factors of equity incentive effectiveness of the board of directors and audit three aspects to research the influence of the company.
Through the case study draws the following conclusions: equity incentive plan kangdexin companies in general in line with the incentive hypothesis, the implementation of effective incentive for kangdexin company executives and key technical personnel, enterprise financial performance significantly enhance the equity incentive program has been widely recognized by institutional investors, the market response is good. This paper argues that Kang Xin company has R & D background, ownership share ideas and can play a decisive role on the effectiveness of the implementation of the listed company shareholders stable control of equity incentive programs; director Kang Xin company will scale, knowledge structure and ability structure and audit the reputation of the institution on the equity incentive plan of kangdexin company has produced important effect.
This article has important reference value for private listed companies to design effective equity incentive programs and create a favorable stock incentive environment. It also provides meaningful reference for stakeholders of listed companies to evaluate the effectiveness of equity incentive programs.

【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F272.92;F426.72

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