股票期权激励行权前后信息披露特征研究

发布时间：2018-02-05 04:55

本文关键词： 股权激励股票期权行权信息披露公司治理　出处：《安徽财经大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：管理层股权激励制度由于其具有的协同效应可以促进企业所有者和经营者的利益一致,而被认为有助于解决委托代理问题,在美国等发达国家中对推进经济发展以及促进公司自我价值创造方面的作用十分明显,但是安然以及世通等大公司在股权激励财务造假方面的丑闻,引发了人们对于该制度的质疑。我国上市公司自2000年之前就开始探索股权激励制度在上市公司中的应用,这也在一定程度上促进了我国相关法律法规的发展,2006年,我国颁布了一系列关于股权激励制度应用的规范性文件,也标志着我国的股权激励制度进入规范发展阶段。股票期权,由于其所赋予激励对象的在未来某个时点以事先规定的价格购买公司股票的权力,在一定程度上将激励者的个人利益和公司的长远发展联系在一起,故而被广泛应用于我国的股权激励制度。但是基于我国税法规定,激励对象在股票期权行权的当天需要按照公司当日股价和行权价格的差额缴纳个人所得税,按照个人薪酬水平适用累进税率,这就决定了激励对象在股票期权行权阶段存在节税动机,并且由于我国上市公司内部治理以及外部监管的不完全有效性,公司的高管可能通过操控信息披露的方式来影响公司股价,继而达到在行权日节税的动机。在这样的背景下,本文以2006年以来有股票期权激励行权记录的上市公司作为研究样本,综合理性经济人、人力产权等理论基础,采用实证和理论分析相结合的研究方法,研究我国上市公司在股票期权激励行权前后的信息披露特征。本文以上市公司的年报、季报、业绩快报和预告作为信息披露的数据来源,先从定性的角度结合盈余管理的数据来判断信息披露的消息类型,再结合公司盈余管理的数据综合研究发现,上市公司倾向于在股票期权行权前披露坏消息,而在行权后披露好消息,并且,盈余管理的证据显示上市公司倾向于在行权前使用真实盈余管理进行向下的盈余管理,而在行权后进行向上的盈余管理。在此结论基础之上,通过建立实证分析模型,对影响因素的进一步研究发现:国有企业较之一般企业更加倾向于在股票期权行权前披露坏消息;董事长和总经理兼任的公司更倾向于在行权前披露坏消息;股权集中度越高,上市公司越不倾向于在行权前披露坏消息;独立董事和监事会的规模越大,上市公司越不倾向于在行权前披露坏消息。最后,本文在综合了信息披露特征以及信息披露特征影响因素的基础之上,本文建议对上市公司的信息披露进行规范管理,并发展多种形式的股权激励方式。
[Abstract]:Management equity incentive system is considered to be helpful to solve the principal-agent problem because of its synergistic effect. In developed countries, such as the United States, the role of promoting economic development and promoting the creation of corporate self-value is very obvious, but large companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the equity incentive financial fraud scandal. Since 2000, Chinese listed companies have begun to explore the application of equity incentive system in listed companies. In 2006, China promulgated a series of normative documents on the application of equity incentive system. Stock option, because of its right to purchase company shares at a specified price at a certain point in the future, is also a sign that the stock incentive system of our country has entered the stage of normative development because of the right to purchase the shares of the company at a predetermined price at a certain point in the future. To a certain extent, the personal interests of the motivator and the long-term development of the company are linked together, so it is widely used in our country's equity incentive system, but based on the provisions of China's tax law. The incentive object should pay the personal income tax according to the difference between the stock price and the exercise price of the company on the day when the stock option is exercised, and the progressive tax rate shall be applied according to the level of individual salary. This determines the incentive object in the stock option exercise stage of tax savings motivation, and because of the internal governance of listed companies and the incomplete effectiveness of external supervision. It is against this backdrop that executives may influence the company's stock price by manipulating disclosure, which in turn leads to a tax incentive on the day it is exercised. In this paper, the listed companies with stock option incentive exercise records since 2006 as a research sample, comprehensive rational economic person, human property rights and other theoretical basis, using empirical and theoretical analysis of the combination of research methods. This paper studies the information disclosure characteristics of listed companies before and after the stock option incentive exercise. This paper takes the annual report, quarterly report, performance KuaiBao and forecast as the data source of information disclosure. First from the qualitative point of view combined with earnings management data to judge the type of information disclosure, and then combined with earnings management data comprehensive research found that listed companies tend to disclose bad news before stock option exercise. And after the exercise of the right to disclose good news, and earnings management evidence shows that listed companies tend to use real earnings management to carry out downward earnings management before exercise. On the basis of this conclusion, an empirical analysis model is established. Further research on the influencing factors shows that state-owned enterprises are more inclined to disclose bad news before stock options exercise than the general enterprises; Companies with both chairman and general manager are more likely to disclose bad news before exercising power; The higher the degree of equity concentration, the less inclined the listed company to disclose bad news before exercising its rights; The larger the scale of the independent director and the board of supervisors, the less likely the listed company is to disclose bad news before the exercise of power. Finally, this paper combines the characteristics of information disclosure and the influencing factors of information disclosure characteristics. This paper proposes to regulate the information disclosure of listed companies and develop various forms of equity incentives.
【学位授予单位】：安徽财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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