交易所激励机制对期货公司监管行为影响的实验研究
发布时间：2019-02-16 18:05
【摘要】：金融市场的自律监管已得到研究者的广泛认可,交易所通过合理的激励措施来影响期货公司的监管行为是缓解道德风险、消除合谋行为的一个可能的"替代性监管机制",但是多重激励效应的难以分离性与参与者非理性偏好的难以量化是相关研究的重要障碍。通过一个期货市场实验,在无奖惩、惩罚、奖励、奖惩联合的机制与可剥离的返佣条件共同构成的8种实验情境下,将量化的参与者风险偏好作为控制变量,检验了不同激励机制对期货公司监管行为的影响,发现惩罚与奖惩联合机制对期货公司的监管行为约束较强,而返佣削弱了奖惩机制的作用。本实验为我国股指期货市场自律监管机制设计提供了具体借鉴。
[Abstract]:The self-regulation of the financial market has been widely recognized by researchers. The exchange through reasonable incentives to affect the regulatory behavior of futures companies is a possible "alternative regulatory mechanism" to alleviate moral hazard and eliminate collusion. However, the inseparability of multiple incentive effects and the difficulty of quantifying the irrational preferences of participants are the important obstacles in related studies. Through a futures market experiment, the quantitative participants' risk preference is taken as the control variable under the eight experimental circumstances, which are composed of no reward and punishment, reward, reward and punishment combined with the detachable conditions of return to commission. The effects of different incentive mechanisms on the regulatory behavior of futures companies are examined. It is found that the combined mechanism of punishment and reward has a strong constraint on the regulatory behavior of futures companies, while the role of reward and punishment mechanism is weakened by the return of domestic helpers. This experiment provides a concrete reference for the design of self-regulatory mechanism of stock index futures market in China.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学管理学院;第二炮兵工程大学审计办公室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173166,71373202)
【分类号】：F832.39
[Abstract]:The self-regulation of the financial market has been widely recognized by researchers. The exchange through reasonable incentives to affect the regulatory behavior of futures companies is a possible "alternative regulatory mechanism" to alleviate moral hazard and eliminate collusion. However, the inseparability of multiple incentive effects and the difficulty of quantifying the irrational preferences of participants are the important obstacles in related studies. Through a futures market experiment, the quantitative participants' risk preference is taken as the control variable under the eight experimental circumstances, which are composed of no reward and punishment, reward, reward and punishment combined with the detachable conditions of return to commission. The effects of different incentive mechanisms on the regulatory behavior of futures companies are examined. It is found that the combined mechanism of punishment and reward has a strong constraint on the regulatory behavior of futures companies, while the role of reward and punishment mechanism is weakened by the return of domestic helpers. This experiment provides a concrete reference for the design of self-regulatory mechanism of stock index futures market in China.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学管理学院;第二炮兵工程大学审计办公室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173166,71373202)
【分类号】：F832.39
【参考文献】
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