控股股东代理问题与公司投融资决策

发布时间：2017-12-31 07:28

本文关键词：控股股东代理问题与公司投融资决策　出处：《武汉大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在完美市场假设下,公司投资支出和增长不取决于融资资金来源,而仅与投资机会多寡有关(Modigliani and Miller,1958)。在放松了MM一系列严格的假设后,Jensen and Meckling (1976)认为管理者与股东之间的利益偏差将影响公司融资行为,进而影响投资支出。Myers and Majluf (1984)也分析得出投资者与公司之间的信息不对称导致公司外部融资成本过高,引发投资不足问题。这些研究以分散的股权结构为背景探讨信息不对称对公司投融资行为的影响,所考虑的代理问题也是由管理者与股东之间的利益偏差引起的。事实上大量研究都发现在世界上的大部分国家中,上市公司的股权都较为集中,存在一个或多个大股东对上市公司进行控制。获得控制权的大股东有能力和动机侵占公司资产、损害其他投资者利益,在这种情况下公司治理的核心问题是如何解决控股股东与其他投资者之间的代理问题,从而有效保护其他投资者利益。我国的情况更是如此,上市公司股权高度集中、外部治理环境不够完善,导致控股股东侵害其他投资者的事件频频发生。除了直接通过关联交易、资金占用等方式侵占公司资产外,控股股东还有可能操纵公司日常经营活动,并在此过程中获取控制权私利。控股股东操纵上市公司日常经营活动的行为主要体现在,通过过度融资、过度投资来增加控制资源规模,从而获得更大的控制权交易或转移时的溢价。本文从三个方面考察了控股股东对公司投融资行为的影响：第一,探讨了控股股东对上市公司现金持有行为的影响,并进一步分析了控股股东控制下现金持有量影响投资支出的机理过程；第二,探讨了控股股东对上市公司债务融资行为的影响,并进一步分析了债务融资对投资支出的影响；第三,探讨了控股股东对上市公司股权再融资行为的影响,并进一步分析了股权再融资行为对投资支出的影响。在回顾和总结已有投融资相关理论和控股股东侵占行为的相关理论和文献后,本文通过构建控股股东控制下的上市公司融资模型,从理论上分析了控股股东对上市公司现金持有量、债务水平以及股权再融资决策的影响。进一步本文分析了控股股东融资行为影响投资支出的机理过程,并采用我国上市公司2003-2011年的经验数据进行了实证研究,本文的研究主要得到了如下几个方面的结论：第一,被西方学者理论和实践证明有效的公司治理机制,如董事会治理、管理者股权激励以及多个大股东股权制衡等不能有效遏制控股股东侵占行为,因而不能起到公司治理、保护投资者利益的作用。主要原因在于上市公司处在控股股东的超强控制之下,董事会、管理者出于控股股东利益实施财务决策,其他大股东持股较低、股权制衡力量有限。第二,通过模型分析和实证检验,本文发现控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突显著影响公司现金持有量。控股股东两权分离系数高、控股股东为国有属性时,公司持有更多的现金资产。进一步研究发现在控制了投融资行为的内生性后,控股股东代理问题较为严重的公司所持有的现金持有量对投资支出的影响更大。以上研究结果说明控股股东出于侵占动机将更多的现金留存于公司内部,并可能将现金资产用于过度投资以获得控制权私利。第三,控股股东与债权人之间的利益偏差显著影响公司债务水平,控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度越大,公司债务水平越高。在控股股东代理问题较为严重时,公司的债务策略更为激进,表现为公司会在现金流增加的情形下以更大比例偿还债务,而在现金流减少的情形下以更大比例增加债务。负债融资并没有发挥相机治理作用而减少投资水平,相反在控股股东代理问题较为严重时,公司举债导致了投资支出的增加。按照这一分析逻辑,当公司已经存在过度投资时,增加债务加剧了过度投资程度。第四,控股股东与潜在股东之间的利益冲突显著影响公司股权再融资计划,控股股东仅会在自身利益增加的情况下发行股票,导致公司股权再融资实施的概率与控股股东两权分离程度成正比。进一步的研究发现,相比于未进行股权再融资的公司,进行了股权再融资的公司投资水平将显著提升,控股股东两权分离程度越大,再融资资金对投资支出的正向影响越强,并且不同程度代理问题下公司增加投资支出所导致的经济后果也存在差异。这些结果说明了控股股东通过股权再融资行为侵占新股东利益,并且通过将融资资金用于投资以增加控制权私利。总的来讲,本文通过对控股股东控制下上市公司的融资行为以及融资影响投资支出的机理过程进行研究,发现在股权集中的情形下,投资者法律保护水平较差时,控股股东自利动机导致公司融资行为、投资行为扭曲。控股股东通过过度融资、过度投资来侵占公司资产,获取控制权私利。控制权与现金流权的分离加剧了控股股东利益侵占行为,损害了其他投资者利益。为了能够有效监督控股股东行为,保护投资者利益,我国必须完善资本市场建设,为各项公司治理机制效应的发挥提供条件。同时还需要提高投资者法律保护水平,引导资源流向效率高的行业和企业,优化资源配置效率。
[Abstract]:In the perfect market assumption, investment spending and growth does not depend on financing sources, but only with the investment opportunity (about Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In the relaxed MM a series of strict assumptions, Jensen and Meckling (1976) considers the interests of deviation between shareholders and managers will affect the company's financing behavior.Myers and, and then affects the investment Majluf (1984) analysis of information asymmetry between the investors and the company's cost of external financing company is too high, cause the problem of inadequate investment. The ownership structure of these studies is to spread the background of the impact of information asymmetry on the company's investment behavior, the agency problem is caused by the deviation between the interests of shareholders and managers.
In fact, a large number of studies have found that most countries in the world, the shares of listed companies are more concentrated, there is one or more large shareholders to control the listed company. The large shareholders have the ability and motivation to misappropriate company assets, other damage the interests of investors, the core issue in this case of corporate governance is how to solve the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other investors, so as to effectively protect the interests of other investors. Especially in the case of China, the equity concentration of listed companies, the external governance environment is not perfect, leading to the controlling shareholders encroach on other investors frequently. In addition to direct through related transactions, funds etc. misappropriate company assets, controlling shareholders may also control the daily business activities of the company, to obtain private benefits of control and in the process.
The controlling shareholder of listed companies to manipulate daily business activities are mainly embodied in, through excessive financing, excessive investment to increase the resources control scale, to gain greater control over the transaction or transfer premium. This paper examines three aspects of the controlling shareholder of the company's investment and financing behavior influence: first, to investigate the effect of holding the shareholders of the cash holdings of listed companies, and further analyzes the controlling shareholder control mechanism of investment expenditure under the influence of cash holdings; second, to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders of listed companies debt financing behavior, and further analysis of the impact of debt financing on investment expenditures; third, to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders of Listed Companies Equity Refinancing Behavior, and further analyzes the Equity Refinancing Behavior of investment spending.
In the review of related theory and summarizes the existing financing theory and the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and literatures, this paper constructs the model of financing of listed companies under the control of the controlling shareholders, from the theoretical analysis of the controlling shareholders of listed companies cash holdings, the impact of debt level and equity refinancing decision. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the process of holding shareholder financing behavior influence mechanism of investment spending, and make an empirical study on the listed companies in China experience data of 2003-2011, this paper obtained the following conclusions:
First, by western scholars theory and practice proves that the effective mechanism of corporate governance, such as board governance, equity incentive management and multiple large shareholder equity balance can not effectively curb the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders, and therefore can not play the corporate governance, protect the interests of investors. The main reason is that under the strong control of Listed Companies in holding the board of shareholders, the implementation of financial decision-making management for the interests of the controlling shareholder and other shareholders equity is low, the balance of power is limited.
Second, through the model analysis and empirical test, this paper found that the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders affect the company's cash holdings. The controlling shareholder of two rights separation coefficient is high, the controlling shareholder is state-owned property, the company holding more cash assets. Further research the control of the endogenous financing behavior. The impact of cash holdings held by the controlling shareholder agency problem is more serious, investment spending even more. This result indicates that the controlling shareholders for occupation motivation will be more cash retained in the company, and may be used for cash assets over investment to obtain private benefits of control.
Third, the interests of deviation between controlling shareholders and creditors affect the company's debt level, the separation degree of controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights is greater, the higher the level of corporate debt. In the controlling shareholder agency problem is more serious, the company's debt strategy is more aggressive, the performance of the company will increase the cash flow in with a greater proportion of debt repayment, while cash flow reduced circumstances with greater increase in the proportion of debt. Debt financing does not play a governance role and reduce the level of investment, on the contrary in the more serious agency problem of controlling shareholder, the company's debt to increase investment spending. According to this analysis logic, when the company already exists over investment, increase debt exacerbated by excessive investment.
Fourth, between the controlling shareholders and potential shareholders conflicts of interest affect the company's equity refinancing plan, the controlling shareholder will only increase in their own interests under the condition of issuing shares, resulting in equity refinancing probability and the controlling shareholder of the implementation of the separation of two rights is proportional to the degree. Further research found that compared to non equity the financing of the company, the level of investment in the equity refinancing of the company will significantly enhance the controlling shareholder, the separation degree of the two rights, refinancing funds positive impact on investment spending is stronger, and the different degree of agency problems under the company increase investment spending caused by the economic consequences are also different. These results show that by controlling shareholders equity refinancing behavior of the new occupation of the interests of shareholders, and the financing funds for investment to increase private benefits of control.
In general, this paper through the research on the process of financing behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies under the control and influence mechanism of financing investment spending, found in concentrated ownership situation, investor protection level is poor, the controlling shareholders self-interest leads to corporate financing behavior, investment behavior distortion. By controlling shareholders over financing, excessive investment embezzlement of company assets, to obtain private benefits of control. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights exacerbated controlling shareholders'entrenchment behavior, damage the interests of other investors. In order to effectively monitor the behavior of controlling shareholders, protect the interests of investors, China must improve the construction of capital market, provide the conditions for the effect of the company governance mechanism. At the same time the need to improve the level of legal protection of investors, guide the flow of resources and high efficiency industries and enterprises, optimize the allocation of resources efficiency.

【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275;F276.6

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