股权激励对上市公司投资效率影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 04:12

本文关键词：股权激励对上市公司投资效率影响的实证研究　出处：《经济纵横》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：选取2008~2014年1484家A股上市公司和宣告并实施股权激励计划的249家上市公司为样本,从股权激励计划实施和高管激励比例两个层面检验股权激励对上市公司投资效率的影响。结果发现,股权激励计划的实施整体上提高了上市公司的投资效率,既能缓解上市公司投资不足,也能抑制其过度投资行为;高管激励比例与非效率投资程度整体呈负相关关系;高管激励比例与上市公司投资不足程度显著负相关,而与过度投资呈U型曲线关系,拐点位置在51%左右。因此,应稳妥深化高管股权激励改革,在全面总结国内外相关改革经验和教训的基础上,进一步完善股权激励制度及相关配套政策与措施,防止股权激励改革的异化发展。对于已实施股权激励的上市公司,应根据自身情况,逐步提高授予高管的股权激励数量占激励总量的比例,以缓解投资不足问题,并抑制过度投资行为,提高上市公司的投资效率。
[Abstract]:From 2008 to 2014, 1484 A-share listed companies and 249 listed companies that announced and implemented equity incentive plan were selected as samples. The effect of equity incentive on the investment efficiency of listed companies is tested from two aspects: the implementation of equity incentive plan and the proportion of executive incentive. The results show that the implementation of equity incentive plan improves the investment efficiency of listed companies as a whole. It can not only alleviate the underinvestment of listed companies, but also restrain their excessive investment behavior; There is a negative correlation between the proportion of incentive and the degree of inefficient investment. The proportion of executive incentive is negatively correlated with the degree of underinvestment of listed companies, while it is U-shaped with over-investment, the inflection point is about 51%. Therefore, we should deepen the reform of executive equity incentive. On the basis of summing up the experience and lessons of relevant reform at home and abroad, we further improve the equity incentive system and related supporting policies and measures. To prevent the alienation development of equity incentive reform. For listed companies that have implemented equity incentive, we should gradually increase the proportion of equity incentive awarded to senior executives in the total incentive according to their own situation. In order to alleviate the problem of insufficient investment, restrain excessive investment behavior and improve the investment efficiency of listed companies.
【作者单位】：吉林大学数量经济研究中心;吉林大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(编号:16JJD790016) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号:71273112)的成果
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
【正文快照】： 在MM理论所描述的资本市场条件下,企业的投资决策与资本结构和融资方式均无关。但现实中,一方面,信息不对称使企业在外部融资过程中面临融资约束而导致投资不足;另一方面,管理者出于私人利益最大化而倾向于耗尽企业的自由现金流,从而导致过度投资。为缓解企业投资不足并抑制管

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