宏观环境和高管超额薪酬对会计信息质量的影响研究
发布时间:2018-01-15 16:45
本文关键词:宏观环境和高管超额薪酬对会计信息质量的影响研究 出处:《安徽大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:经济信息在宏观经济管理中起到至关重要的作用,是利益相关者与企业沟通的桥梁,是企业与竞争对手相抗衡的重要手段,是政府进行宏观调控不可或缺的决策依据。市场经济的发展和完善越来越离不开经济信息的支撑和导向,而信息质量是保障企业治理机制设置合理性、资源配置有效性的重要前提。会计信息作为经济信息中的重要组成部分,在资本市场运行中具有举足轻重的地位。然而,随着证券市场的发展,众多上市公司纷纷曝出会计信息质量丑闻,会计信息质量也因此成为社会各界人士讨论的热门话题。尽管证监会等管理机构不断提出完善会计信息披露的方式、方法,规范和约束会计信息造假行为,但这并没有从根源上解决会计信息失真的问题。会计信息质量与公司内外部因素息息相关,内部因素中,高层管理人员的专业水平和道德素养对会计信息的真实性和可靠性具有重大的直接影响;外部因素中,作为企业赖以生存的宏观环境不容忽视。因此本文将我国经济转型时期的外部宏观环境与作为公司内部治理机制重要的组成部分——高管薪酬、超额薪酬相结合,从委托代理理论、薪酬契约理论、管理层权力理论入手,运用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法,探讨外部宏观环境和高管超额薪酬对会计信息质量的综合影响,为改善我国上市公司会计信息质量提供相应的政策建议。本文的研究内容共有五部分组成。第一部分为绪论,主要阐述在转型时期经济背景下本文研究的理论意义和实践意义以及研究思路和研究方法,回顾国内外相关文献的研究成果,并对其进行评述。第二部分为概念界定和理论基础,主要介绍宏观环境、高管薪酬、高管超额薪酬和会计信息质量等概念,并阐述委托代理理论、管理层权力理论、薪酬契约理论等。第三部分为制度背景、理论分析与研究假设,首先对我国近年来面临的宏观环境与上市公司高管薪酬的现状进行描述与分析,然后论述宏观环境、高管超额薪酬对会计信息质量的作用机理,并据此提出本文的研究假设。第四部分为实证检验,本文选取2009—2015年沪深两市A股上市公司11638个观测值为研究样本,采用OLS回归方法,检验本文提出的假设。第五部分为本文的研究结论与政策建议。研究发现:(1)宏观环境与会计信息质量显著正相关,即宏观环境越好,会计信息质量越高,说明宏观环境作为外生变量对公司治理产生重要影响;(2)高管超额薪酬能显著提升会计信息质量,即高管超额薪酬越高,会计信息质量越好,高薪是高管能力的体现,说明薪酬契约理论在我国仍具有一定的适用性;(3)随着宏观环境的改善,高管超额薪酬对提升会计信息质量的作用越来越小,即宏观环境减弱了高管超额薪酬对会计信息质量的促进作用;(4)与民营企业相比,宏观环境对国有企业高管超额薪酬之于会计信息质量的抑制作用更强,这可能是由于国有企业拥有更为有利的发展环境以及薪酬约束机制的影响,说明由产权性质带来的经济后果的差异值得深入研究。
[Abstract]:Economic information plays a crucial role in macroeconomic management, is a bridge between stakeholders and corporate communication, is an important means of enterprise and competitors, is the government's macro-control indispensable basis for decision-making. The development and perfection of market economy more and more support and guidance cannot do without economic information, and information quality is the guarantee of the rationality of setting up the mechanism of corporate governance, an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of resource allocation. Accounting information is an important part of economic information, plays an important role in the capital market. However, with the development of the stock market, many listed companies have exposed the scandal of the quality of accounting information, accounting information quality has also become popular topic of community discussion. Although continuously put forward and perfect the accounting information disclosure way, the Commission and other regulatory agencies, and norms The constraint of accounting information fraud, but this did not solve the problem of distortion of accounting information from the source. The internal and external factors is closely related to the quality of accounting information and company internal factors, have great influence of the senior management personnel professional level and moral qualities of the authenticity and reliability of accounting information; the external factors, as macro the survival of the enterprise environment can not be ignored. This paper will be the period of economic transformation in China's external macro environment and as an important part of the internal mechanism of corporate governance, executive compensation, excess compensation combination from the principal-agent theory, compensation theory, starting with the management power theory, using the method of combining normative research and empirical research. To discuss the effect of external macro environment, and executive compensation in excess of the quality of accounting information, to improve the quality of accounting information of Listed Companies in China To provide the corresponding policy recommendations. The research content of this paper consists of five parts. The first part is the introduction, mainly expounds the background of the economic transition period under the theoretical and practical significance of research and research ideas and research methods, research the literature review results, and carries on the review. The second part is the concept of the definition and theoretical basis, mainly introduces the macro environment, executive compensation, executive excess compensation and the quality of accounting information concept, and elaborates the principal-agent theory, managerial power theory, compensation contract theory. The third part is the system background, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, first the current situation of executive compensation in our country is facing the macro environment in recent years the listed companies with the description and analysis, and then discusses the macro environment, the mechanism of executive compensation in excess of the quality of accounting information, and puts forward the research in this paper accordingly Hypothesis. The fourth part is the empirical test, this paper selects 2009 - 2015 Shanghai and Shenzhen two listed A shares 11638 observations as the research sample, using the OLS regression method, test the hypothesis proposed in this paper. The fifth part is the conclusions and policy recommendations. The study found that: (1) is significantly related to the macro environment and accounting the quality of information, namely the macro environment better, the higher the quality of accounting information, that the macro environment as an exogenous variable has an important impact on corporate governance; (2) executive excess compensation can significantly improve the quality of accounting information, namely the executive excess compensation is higher, the better the quality of accounting information, the money is reflected the executive ability, that compensation contract theory is still has certain applicability in our country; (3) with the improvement of the macroeconomic environment, the smaller the excess compensation of executives and to improve the quality of accounting information, the macroeconomic environment weakened the excess compensation for Executives The quality of accounting information and promote the effect; (4) compared with the private enterprises, the macro environment of the inhibition on state-owned enterprise executives pay excess on the quality of accounting information is stronger, this may be due to state-owned enterprises have a more favorable environment for development and pay restraint mechanism effect, worthy of in-depth study that the difference caused by property right the economic consequences.
【学位授予单位】:安徽大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F275;F832.51
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 边泓;贾婧;张君子;;会计盈余激进度反转对盈余持续性的影响研究[J];会计与经济研究;2016年02期
2 罗昆;;寻租抑或辩护:同业参照效应、超额薪酬增长与薪酬业绩敏感性[J];财贸研究;2015年05期
3 陈孝勇;惠晓峰;;创业投资的治理作用:——基于高管薪酬契约设计视角的实证研究[J];南开管理评论;2015年02期
4 王爱国;徐向真;;高管薪酬、在职消费、薪酬差距与企业绩效——来自2010~2012年沪深上市中央管理企业的经验数据[J];财务研究;2015年02期
5 王茂林;林慧婷;;产权性质、股权结构与会计信息价值相关性——股权分置改革的经验数据[J];现代管理科学;2015年01期
6 肖慧琳;李卫锋;;高管决策的情绪调节机制:基于准实验现场的研究[J];管理科学学报;2014年10期
7 胡华夏;洪荭;廖俊洁;;经济周期、管理者过度自信与盈余管理[J];财会通讯;2014年06期
8 张亮亮;黄国良;;管理者超额薪酬与资本结构动态调整[J];财贸研究;2013年05期
9 陈武朝;;经济周期、行业景气度与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J];审计研究;2013年05期
10 杨晋渝;刘斌;孙立;;盈余管理、高管薪酬敏感度和股权结构[J];重庆大学学报(社会科学版);2013年02期
,本文编号:1429220
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/touziyanjiulunwen/1429220.html