期望绩效反

发布时间：2018-02-10 20:39

本文关键词： 期望绩效反馈行业竞争压力企业并购　出处：《商业研究》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：并购是企业利用外部资源实现竞争优势的战略选择,本文以2011-2015年间沪深两市发生并购行为主并方的A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察企业期望绩效反馈、行业竞争压力与企业并购行为的关系,以及行业竞争压力对期望绩效反馈与企业并购之间关系的调节作用。研究发现,当企业期望绩效反馈为负向时,随着期望绩效差距的扩大,企业并购意愿及并购规模先升后降,呈倒U型关系;行业竞争压力正向促进企业并购行为,当企业未实现组织期望绩效时,行业竞争压力对期望绩效差距与企业并购行为的倒U型关系存在显著的正向调节效应。上述结论深化了对期望绩效反馈问题的认识,间接考察了企业高管与股东或董事会之间在期望绩效差距存在的情况下在企业并购决策上的分工机制,为企业并购行为的影响因素提供了新的视角,对经理层和股东如何通过理性的并购决策弥合期望绩效差距、防范并购风险具有一定的理论解释意义和实践参考价值。
[Abstract]:M & A is a strategic choice for enterprises to use external resources to realize their competitive advantage. This paper takes the A-share listed companies with merger and acquisition in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research samples from 2011-2015 to investigate the expected performance feedback of enterprises. The relationship between industry competition pressure and M & A behavior, as well as the regulatory effect of industry competition pressure on the relationship between expected performance feedback and M & A, is found when the expected performance feedback is negative. With the widening of the expected performance gap, the M & A willingness and M & A scale first rise and then decrease, presenting a inverted U-shaped relationship, and the industry competitive pressure is positive to promote the M & A behavior, when the enterprise fails to achieve organizational expected performance. The industry competition pressure has significant positive adjustment effect on the reverse U-shape relationship between the expected performance gap and the M & A behavior. The above conclusions deepen the understanding of the expected performance feedback problem. The mechanism of division of labor between executives and shareholders or the board of directors in M & A decision-making is investigated indirectly, which provides a new perspective for the influencing factors of M & A behavior. It is of theoretical significance and practical reference value for managers and shareholders to bridge the gap of expected performance and prevent M & A risks through rational M & A decisions.
【作者单位】：三峡大学经济与管理学院;
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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