利益相关者、公司治理与盈余管理:基于文献的研究

发布时间：2018-02-22 21:08

本文关键词： 利益相关者公司治理盈余管理监督效应压力效应替代效应　出处：《商业研究》2017年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：公司治理理论自股东治理观逐渐发展到利益相关者共同治理观以来,利益相关者能否有效发挥治理作用一直是被广泛研究的问题。本文从盈余管理的视角切入,利用文献研究法,通过考察利益相关者能否对高管盈余管理行为形成制约来探讨其公司治理作用。梳理相关文献发现,分析师、机构投资者、媒体、审计师和供应商/客户等利益相关者对高管盈余管理行为发挥着重要的治理作用,其治理效果可概括为监督效应、压力效应、替代效应;利益相关者与公司利益关联的性质、程度与作用渠道的不同,其公司治理效果存在显著差异;利益相关者治理效果存在替代效应,其异质性和公司特征、内部治理机制、外部环境都会影响各主体的成本和收益,最终影响公司治理效果。因此,应从强化内部治理机制和改善外部环境两个方面改善利益相关者公司治理效果,以最大化地发挥其监督效应并减少压力效应带来的机会主义行为。
[Abstract]:The theory of corporate governance has been widely studied since the concept of shareholder governance gradually developed to the concept of common governance of stakeholders, and whether the stakeholders can effectively play the role of governance has been widely studied in this paper from the perspective of earnings management. By using the literature research method, this paper discusses the corporate governance role of the stakeholders by examining whether the stakeholders can restrict the earnings management behavior of the senior executives, and combing the relevant literature finds that analysts, institutional investors, media, Auditor, supplier / customer and other stakeholders play an important role in the governance of earnings management behavior of executives. The governance effect can be summarized as supervisory effect, pressure effect, substitution effect, the nature of stakeholder and corporate interest correlation. There are significant differences in corporate governance effect between different degree and function channel, the substitution effect of stakeholder governance effect, its heterogeneity and company characteristics, internal governance mechanism and external environment will all affect the cost and income of the main body. Therefore, we should strengthen the internal governance mechanism and improve the external environment to improve the corporate governance effect of stakeholders. In order to maximize its monitoring effect and reduce the stress effect of opportunistic behavior.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学国际学院(苏州研究院);苏州大学东吴商学院;
【基金】：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目,项目编号:17XNH087 江苏高校哲学社会科学重大项目,项目编号:2017ZDAXM017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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